

Bureaucracy for a Democracy: The Struggle of the Philippine Political Leadership and the Civil Service in the Post-Marcos Period

LEDIVINA V. CARIÑO*

Transition from authoritarianism to democracy can breed strained relations between the political leadership and its civil service. Each institution faces a dilemma. The political leadership must redemocratize and remove vestiges of authoritarianism in society, including residual influences left in the civil service it inherited from its predecessor-regime. On the other hand, the bureaucracy as both instrument and victim of authoritarianism wishes to be part of the redemocratization of society, but has to labor under the distrust of its past by the new political leadership. Under these conditions, the new government employs various policies, actions and decisions in attempting to redemocratize the bureaucracy. These involve changes in personnel, organization, practices and programs of the civil service. However, the process by which these changes are carried out by the political leadership could invite questions on its avowal for democratic ideals.

Introduction

When Corazon C. Aquino ousted Ferdinand E. Marcos from the presidency, most of the Philippines rejoiced with her. They included a big proportion of civil servants who had braved the threats of the authoritarian regime by voting for her at probably the same percentage as the general population¹. They were pushed into the Aquino camp by years of chafing under the dictatorship, buoyed up by the assurances of Candidate Aquino that

I will retain everyone in government whose personal performance meets the standards the job requires.²

Upon being installed, however, her government removed in one fell swoop the security of tenure of all incumbent personnel:

*Professor, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

This is the revised version of the paper read at the Conference on "Reflections on Development," held at Bellagio, Italy, July 25 to August 12, 1988. The author is grateful for the fellowship extended by the Rockefeller Foundation which allowed her to undertake the research on "The Civil Service under Political System Discontinuities," of which this paper is a part. She has also profited from comments of Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler and the participants of the Bellagio Conference on an earlier draft.

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.³

This was the opening salvo of the battle between the Aquino government and the civil service⁴ it inherited from the previous regime. The conflict has continued throughout the Aquino presidency.

This paper is a narrative and an analysis of that struggle. As a narrative, it will describe the decisions made by the political leadership to effect changes in the civil service during the period. At the same time, recognizing that the civil service is not a passive bystander in these events, this paper will also discuss its decisions and actions. As each gets demands and supports from various sectors of society in their respective moves, relevant activities of these groups will be described also.

The Aquino-bureaucracy conflict can be seen as a simple problem of succession, when a new political leadership encounters a remnant of its predecessor-regime, and vice versa. It is, however, much more than that. The new government has proclaimed its commitment to redemocratization and the removal of the vestiges of the authoritarian leadership, including in them the permanent civil service. Thus, the case shows one regime's mode of transforming an organization that had serviced a dictatorship to an instrument of a democratic government.

On the other hand, the bureaucracy is not simply a Marcosian leftover. Its development through the authoritarian period is not devoid of certain democratizing features. Moreover, it is critical of the regime's way of relating to it, as it seeks redemocratization using democratic standards and methods. The ongoing struggle is thus not a clear division of the good against the evil forces. After all, both the political leadership and the bureaucracy raise the banner of democracy on their sides.

I agree with the protagonists on the centrality of democracy, as goal and process, in their current controversy. Democratization is after all a major element in the political development of nations. In this paper, then, I attempt to evaluate the claims of the political leadership and the civil service as manifested in their rhetoric and action from February 1986, when Corazon Aquino took over the reins of government, to February 1988.⁵ I hope to contribute through this analysis to the understanding of the relationship of bureaucracy and democracy in a nation emerging from authoritarianism.

The Regime and the Bureaucracy

With the scope and size of government in modern states, no new leadership can afford to create a bureaucracy *de novo* anymore as the Americans did in the Philippine Islands in 1898. Rather, an incoming regime uses the mix of merit and spoils that has evolved in that political system to deal with its bureaucracy. Generally, the regime's clout is manifested in its use of appointment powers, organizational changes and new policies to put forward its political program. For its part, the civil service may respond with enthusiasm, simply submit, put up

resistance, or attempt to ignore (to the extent possible) the directives of its new superiors.

The leadership is not automatically master of the bureaucracy. But it has two main things in its favor: legitimacy and the fact of power-holding itself. The first may be earned by victory at the polls or some other acceptable means of gaining power. Barring that, it may be won after a time if the regime convinces the people that

in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience.⁶

The bureaucracy itself may not need such a testing period, if it is trained to believe that all power-holders must be obeyed. LaPorte suggests that the bureaucracy usually reaches

some accommodation with whoever is in power (since) ...high level civil officers in all societies understand power and its use.

Yet such submission does not imply that civil servants can not in some way hold the reins themselves. A study of public officialdom in the days of Frederick the Great can summarize even contemporary accounts of the sources from which the bureaucracy derives advantages over the political leadership:

from the impersonal basis of its strength; from its huge size as an organization; from its permanence, functional indispensability, and monopoly of expert knowledge; from its self-consciousness as an aristocratic status group and power elite; and from its patient and oblique obstructiveness.⁸

Many governments have thus found to their dismay that their reform efforts are stymied by a recalcitrant bureaucracy.⁹ Others found their policy initiatives ignored unless they "strengthened the capacity of ... bureaucracies to dominate their environments."¹⁰ Thus a new government must show its ability to dominate the bureaucracy before things get out of hand. It is particularly important when the new leadership wants to distance itself from the old as much as possible.¹¹ Corazon Aquino's takeover from a discredited regime in 1986 was one such situation. However, most successions and bureaucratic changes in the Philippines have been much less tumultuous.

Development of the Philippine Civil Service

The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,000 islands Southeast of the mainland of Asia and was a Spanish colony from 1521 to 1898. Pre-Spanish Philippines was a set of little kingdoms with different languages and forms of government, trading with each other, with China, and with parts of what are now Indonesia and Malaysia. Spain coopted the local rulers and installed a central bureaucracy over

them. The latter was largely composed of adventurous persons who had bought their positions in Madrid and regarded their stint in the distant colony as life's major investment, the returns to be extracted as soon as possible.

Spain ruled with the cross on one hand and a sword on the other and between the two of them, denigrated and almost obliterated the local culture, oppressed the natives and exacted what it could of the richness of the territory. Endemic rebellions culminated in the Revolution of 1898 which succeeded in installing a Filipino government. It was thwarted in its goal of independence by the Treaty of Paris, under which Spain ceded the colony to the revolutionaries' erstwhile ally, the United States.

The US ruled under martial law until 1902 when, satisfied with the pace of its pacification of the natives, it imposed a civil government and opened public schools as its new major instrument of domination. The native elite who had collaborated with Spain won the first political and judicial positions. Thus, the government practically had to create a new bureaucracy from scratch with its military officials who had remained, American teachers and the sprinkling of literate Filipinos who could pass the civil service examinations. The Americans installed a merit system in one of the first laws of the civil government, including in it the dream of US civil service reformers who by then had succeeded in putting a similar law in only three other states of the Union. Thus did the Philippine bureaucracy start, committed to the norms of merit and political neutrality, even as it developed circumventions against patronage and other rules so subtle that the Americans never became fully aware of them.¹²

A major change occurred in 1913 with the drive by the Democratic Party to transfer the bureaucracy to Filipinos, as the judiciary had been by 1907 and the legislature were to be in 1916. A Filipino president was elected in 1935 under the Commonwealth Government, which was expected to be a ten-year transition period. World War II, however, delayed nominal Philippine independence by a year.

The Philippine Constitution of 1935 provided for a presidential system with three separate but equal branches. From 1946 to 1971, two main political parties, hardly distinguishable from each other in terms of policy or even personality,¹³ alternated in power, competing in bloody and fraud-ridden elections. Nevertheless, these gained legitimacy because incumbent presidents regularly lost in their bid for reelection and a number of candidates from whichever was the opposition also won. The Communist Party was outlawed in 1948 and McCarthy-like witch hunts plagued proponents of nationalist, anti-US and pro-peasant positions periodically. The US has maintained a strong presence in its ex-colony, with the largest military bases outside North America, parity with Filipinos in the access to their natural resources, and dominance in the country's counter-insurgency activities as well as in its trade and industry.

The Filipino pattern was bureaucratic subordination to the political leadership, established since the Commonwealth period.¹⁴ Thus it has not been a force to worry the political leadership since its creation. The bureaucracy was modernized, avowedly neutral, and had a strong formal commitment to the merit system. The

career system extended up to the undersecretary level. It was expected that temporary appointees (called "casuals") would lose their jobs when a new government assumed office, but others with tenure could stay on, even if initially recruited through politicians no longer in power. Promotions were based on seniority and were rarely interfered with by politicians.¹⁵

The Bureaucracy under Marcos

Ferdinand E. Marcos, once reelected in 1969 and ineligible for reelection in 1973, staged a palace coup in 1972 and arrogated all powers unto himself. He abolished the legislature, silenced mass media and imprisoned his political opponents and other dissenters. Manipulating the Constitution of 1973 whenever it suited him, he changed the governmental form from a presidential to a parliamentary, then to a quasi-parliamentary system in eight years.

The civil service ostensibly he did not touch. A new Civil Service Law reenshrined the merit system and strengthened the career service formally. However, Marcos changed the bureaucracy during the authoritarian regime in four ways.

First, he authorized summary dismissals, and used that power throughout his reign for employees he considered intractable. In addition, he asked courtesy resignations of all civil servants, so that anyone could lose his job even if he could not fit under any of the already broad causes of summary dismissals.¹⁶

Second, he enjoined all sectors to participate in his New Society Movement (the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*, KBL). KBL would later become the administration party, catching non-partisan officials and employees off-guard. Their formal membership, however, was not as damning as the political uses to which they were subjected – in election campaigns, in popular mobilization (read: "propaganda"), in fudging statistics and window-dressing programs and in other politically charged efforts to extol the regime and particularly, its conjugal leaders.¹⁷

Third, he encouraged the bureaucracy to nurture an image of itself as a source of societal direction. Marcos exhorted the civil service to be "the conscience of the nation as it turns the society around." To develop nationalist political commitment in an American-trained bureaucracy was not wrong. However, what was envisioned did not happen. With the legislature abolished and mass media controlled, policy proposals did not profit from open debates and considerations of public interest did not figure very much in them. Instead, they were instantly produced by a willing president whose legislative output was prodigious. This inordinate penchant to legislate allowed any person with access a chance to have his proposal become law. A few career officials with such access managed to have their draft policies enacted. They thus developed a new sense of power. However, it was not enjoyed by the rest of the bureaucracy which remained timid, uncreative, or subordinate.

Fourth, Marcos blurred the distinction between political and administrative officials and positions. He appointed deputy ministers (now the equivalent of

"undersecretaries") from among his elected legislators. On the other side, he named career personnel to political positions and then made many of his technocrats – some career officials, some not – run for office. This made higher political levels the peak of civil service, encouraging political ambitions of career civil servants. This was a novelty in the Philippines where, unlike in countries such as India,¹⁸ even retired civil servants do not seek elective public office.

These changes weakened the long-standing neutrality of the civil service in different ways. The first two made it more conscious of the power of the political leadership and more cautious about its actions, thus hardening inflexibility and inefficiency in an already rigid system. The other two were enjoyed by persons in higher positions. While these cultivated bureaucratic loyalty to current power holders, these also unleashed power potentials hitherto dormant in the Philippine civil service.

Confronted by such a bureaucracy and committed to its restoration as a democratic instrument, the Aquino government decided to reform it in several ways. The main elements of the regime-bureaucracy struggle in 1986-88 involved changes in personnel, organization, practices and programs of the civil service. These were started simultaneously and faced by the Aquino government along with the other elements of its redemocratization agenda. It is worthwhile to study the contents of that agenda both to place moves affecting the bureaucracy in context and to see continuities and contrasts with the government's handling of its civil service, and of the larger political system and society.

Aquino's Redemocratization Efforts

Aquino came to power with hardly any platform except to be "the opposite of Marcos." Beyond "restoring democracy," her vision for the society remains vague; one must fathom it from various sources – pronouncements, actions, and reactions of her government since it came into office.

Any redemocratization program would have two major components: the restoration of the institutions associated with democracy to their old, or even finer, luster; and the nurturance of the substance of democracy. The Aquino government's relationship with the bureaucracy is first an aspect of institutional reformation. In addition, it provides insights into how the political leadership substantiates democracy.

The centerpiece of the first is a new Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified in the first year of Aquino's rule. In addition, judicial reform and the election of members of Congress put in place the democratic machinery.

Aquino's commitment to power dispersion was manifested as soon as she assumed office. Although she could have enjoyed dictatorial powers, the provisional constitution of the revolutionary government incorporated the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.¹⁹

At the start, her commitment to political freedoms were unassailable. During her first months in office, she released all political prisoners and created a com-

mission to deal with human rights violations. She followed these up with ceasefire talks with all insurgent groups. The Moro National Liberation Front (the secessionist movement of Muslim Mindanao), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, representing the aspirations of minority communities in Northern Luzon, gained autonomy for two regions. As a result, rebellions there have largely ceased except as they have been taken over by the communist New People's Army (NPA).

However, negotiations with the Left had broken down, and the NPA rebellion has even intensified. Upon pressure from the military, the Aquino government has "unsheathed the sword of war" in its second year of administration.

The Aquino government is also hemmed in by the Right, including the landlord class who opposes agrarian reform. Some military officers have tried to move into the center of power to an extent which they did not enjoy under Marcos. The latter had allowed them perquisites but retained control over them until the end.

At the end of 1987, Amnesty International, regarded as an ally of the erstwhile Opposition, criticized the government for human rights violations. An incident highlighted in its Report capsulizes the regime's unclear directions in substantiating democracy. This was the massacre in front of the presidential palace on January 22, 1987. Television cameras caught soldiers training their guns on and killing about twenty unarmed protesters who were part of a rally that demanded real agrarian reform. That demand would still not be answered at the end of her first two years, although a token "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program" would be hastily promulgated as one of the "midnight executive orders," i.e., issued just before the President's law-making powers expired with the reopening of Congress.

Of other egalitarian demands, the President would "keep her options open" or change according to the pressures. A stirring Labor Day declaration in 1986 would not be legislated until almost a year had passed. The halt on squatter eviction and other complaints of the urban poor have remained unheard. The government's revenue measures would be an administratively simple but regressive value-added tax and the exemption of stock dividends from taxation.

Other issues are similarly unresolved. Growth before debt, a policy espoused by her own economic planning secretary, has floundered, despite the general outcry against appropriating 40 per cent of the national budget to debt service. The Philippine position on the lease of American military bases, which will expire in 1991, has not been decided on.

Aquino's redemocratization program is most manifest as a commitment to formal democracy. This is not a small accomplishment considering that the populace is now free of the restrictions and harassments under Marcos. Moreover, this preference appears to stem from her view of the role of the presidency in a democracy, which would rather not preempt what superior collective judgments could surface from open debates and non-violent processes.

However, although their conflicts are not zero-sum games, there is no real middle ground between landlords and tenants, labor and management, pro- and

anti-US bases groups. Compromises can be made, but the government must be clear for whom it practices affirmative discrimination. What emerges from the silence and the non-choice is almost always a leaning towards the status quo. In a highly unequal society, choices in its favor will not bring the substance of democracy to the greater number of Filipinos, and do not differentiate her that much from Marcos.

Redemocratization for the Bureaucracy

The most comprehensive official articulation of Aquino's vision of "bureaucracy for democracy" was embodied in the report of the Presidential Commission on Governmental Reorganization (PCGR). Locating itself in the revolutionary process, it declared:

We must systematically "de-Marcosify" Philippine society....The structures and processes that tended to perpetuate the old order have to be attacked swiftly and systematically.²⁰

"De-Marcosification" was used against the judiciary, constitutional commissions, legislature, military, and local governments. Indeed, it went beyond government to encompass the whole society.

De-Marcosification can involve both positive and negative actions. When it tends towards the negative, it exemplifies what Linz calls "*ressentiment* politics," shown by a new leadership when it acts out its anger against persons and institutions identified with the old order.²¹ This desire to put down the predecessor-regime is a statement of what the present regime chooses *not* to be. But to move forward the new leadership must also profess where it is headed.

The five guiding principles introduced by PCGR attempted to provide that. Three might be regarded as constituting the "political guide"²² in that they related the bureaucracy's role to the larger society. These were the promotion of private initiative; decentralization, which "concretizes the government's avowed goal of democratizing power;"²³ and accountability to curb "the wanton exercise of discretionary powers (the prime source of abuses of the past)."²⁴

The other principles were more administrative in nature: the efficiency of frontline services, and cost-effectiveness of operations. Internally oriented, they recalled previous overhauls which generally aimed to "secure *greater economy and efficiency* in the conduct of government business."²⁵

The first principle provided a glimpse of substantive direction in that, as it committed government to the promotion of private enterprise, it thus defined the government's role and scope. That definition followed the capitalist idea of a government which only takes up what are left undone or unwanted by the business community. It was repeated in the current development plan which affirmed the view of the private sector as "the engine for growth"²⁶ and took up the World Bank prescription of privatization and deregulation, a policy sold to Marcos but which he was not able to implement.²⁷

Primacy of private initiative suggests a view of government that will not act vigorously to change current arrangements. This may explain the absence of new major programs towards using government as a means of redistribution and redress of past inequities.

The PCGR includes under this guiding principle a second set of ideas, the concept of reliance on community self-help and people power, which implies a stress different from privatization. The principle of people participation demands that government become more responsive to demands of the weak. These populist measures may then press for reforms in the social structure, even as the primacy of private enterprise points to the continued hegemony of the strong. It may be symptomatic of the unclear commitments of the Aquino government that neither the reorganization report nor the medium term plan – which also enshrines both ideas – attempted to resolve this contradiction.²⁸

The other principles as discussed in the PCGR report were similarly broad. "Decentralization" was regarded as the democratization of power. It focused on the expansion of authority of local governments, the increase of their resources and the removal of central controls.

The next principle, "accountability," emphasized responsible performance of governmental functions rather than procedures of regularity or waste avoidance. Indeed, accountability may be enhanced by focusing on what results rulers owe the ruled.

A political principle left out by PCGR is equity and fairness. This includes not just Weber's delivery of governmental services *sine ira et studio*, but a more positive commitment to use government as a mechanism to redress past inequities, and to address questions of poverty and the wide gap between the rich and the poor. It may be argued that attention to this issue can be manifested more in budgetary allocations. However, this question can also be tackled in reorganization through the creation of agencies addressed to these issues, the relative increase of positions in social programs (even as the fat is trimmed in others) or the placement of these organizations closer to power centers.

The reorganization commission made a valiant attempt to embody the incumbent government's vision – both political and administrative – for the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, these substantive emphases seemed to be swallowed up in the plethora of charting personnel boxes and slots and renaming organizational units. Thus, as implemented, its principles seem to continue the emphasis on form also manifested in the societal agenda discussed earlier.

In the section below, I shall take the PCGR criteria on their own terms. These principles can constitute the democratic methods of administration that, if used in delivering programs that would substantiate democracy, will make the bureaucracy truly a tool of a redemocratizing government. In the sections that follow, I shall describe and assess how these principles along with de-Marcosification have fared in the struggle between the Aquino leadership and the civil service.

The Attempts to Purify the Bureaucracy

In a major campaign speech, Candidate Aquino declared:

I want to see again in the Philippine bureaucracy the qualities for which it was renowned: honesty, competence, helpfulness, and humility. I want our civil servants to have again a sense of pride in government service.²⁹

As may be noted, she mentioned virtues and attitudes. Thus even then, she presaged that the change would emphasize people rather than structures.

Prelude to the Purge: Dismissal of Judicial and Elected Officials

Purification began at the highest levels. In her inaugural speech, President Aquino asked for the resignation of all officials, "starting with the justices of the Supreme Court." The affected justices cited separation of powers but later acknowledged that in a Revolution, ordinary rules did not apply. The President reappointed three of the more independent Marcos appointees. Officials of constitutional bodies – formally independent of the three branches – were also solicited courtesy resignations, most of which were accepted. They had in various ways joined the election campaign of the deposed president and thus had violated the independence principle they were claiming to justify their retention. The declaration of a revolutionary government automatically disbanded Marcos' National Assembly. There was still no outcry against the purge; on the other hand, the first removals were very popular.

The OIC Problem and Local Bureaucracies

Within a week of being appointed Secretary of Local Government, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. demanded the resignation of all local officials. The axe had now entered a different realm. These were not Marcos appointees but elected officials (although, not necessarily all in honest polls). Unlike assemblymen, they were not mere rubber stamps. The precedent set by Marcos was also pertinent: he abolished the legislature in 1972 but retained local officials. Changing such a big group, distributed throughout the archipelago, could be very destabilizing. Besides, since local governments were very dependent on the center, coopting them – as Marcos did to the governors and mayors elected from opposition ranks in 1971 and 1980 – seemed to be an easier alternative.

Few incumbents resigned. No matter, officers-in-charge (OICs) were appointed to take their place. Without formal turnovers, many local governments became a circus. Some former officials took government records home, leaving the new appointees unable to operate. On the other hand, some OICs could not operate even with all the records, because of competence problems and because government forms and procedures could be mere gobbledygook to the uninitiated.

Appointees at the local level were a motley crowd. It included OIC-Governors Daniel Lacson of Negros Occidental and Roberto Pagdanganan of Bulacan. The former is a sugar planter and civic leader who proposed a moderate agrarian reform scheme, tackled the starvation problem in his province and became an instant

media star; the latter was a corporation executive who turned in such a good performance that he ran virtually unopposed in the 1988 local elections.³⁰ There were examples of the other kind: persons so poor in executive ability that they could not control their territories. Into such power vacuum, the rebel NPAs came and managed to control more areas than ever before. The qualifications of many appointees were questioned not only by persons they deposed but by neutral citizens. A confidential memorandum from a ranking member of the Corazon Aquino for President Movement (CAPM) listed several OICs who had estafa (swindling) charges, leading to the grim joke that that was a new qualification for local executives.

Independent observers suggested immediate local elections as a less tumultuous way of handling local governments. However, they were rejected since a new general registration was needed before genuine voters could be ascertained. The next recommendation was to replace only the proven crook but this required due process and was rejected as time-consuming.

Almost all local executives and legislators were changed except the few who were affiliated with the erstwhile Opposition. Coming in through a purge so wholesale, officers-in-charge also moved for a blanket removal of the local bureaucracy which, unlike them, formed part of the career service. Both casuals and permanent employees were dismissed as many of them had been appointed by the deposed mayor or governor.³¹ Protests against the OICs made the term a dirty word. Dismissals at local levels also tended to be more drastic than anything which occurred in the center. However, with local bureaucracies smaller and having less access to media, the unrest tended to be confined within local boundaries and were largely ignored by Manila. Nevertheless, they set the tone for the later purges at the national civil service.

Three National Level Alternatives

The proposal to remove undesirables was initially welcome. Many employees themselves felt that their ranks were dishonored by the unabashed electioneering and corruption of the previous administration. They were uncomfortable with them even though they may have joined them, justifying their behavior as their duty to obey superior orders.

Unsolicited resignations came from political officials and Career Executive Service Officers (CESOs)³² either so identified with Marcos or so sure of Aquino's incapacity for the job that they could not continue to work for her government. But in a shrunken economy with little possibility for alternative employment, few had the courage of their convictions. After the first weeks, it became clear to the new Cabinet members that they had to be aggressive in cleaning up their offices. In doing so, they took one of three alternatives.

The first asked for courtesy resignations of all ranking personnel, their evaluation, and removal of those who did not pass the evaluation. This was *the purge* which will be discussed further below.

The second provided generous benefits for those who would voluntarily leave, thus killing two birds with one stone: "trimming the fat" in the organization, which produced a bonus if those they specifically wanted to leave got the message; and helping in the economic recovery (on the assumption that the big pensions would go into productive investments). As the Development Bank of the Philippines stated:

We look at our resignees and retirees as "development agents," well-educated, trained and motivated individuals, whom DBP is releasing into the economy. Most of them have already indicated their intentions to put up their own... projects, and do their bit for economic recovery.³³

The third was exemplified by the Ministry of Social Services and Development which reported that it kept all its personnel, including casuals

rather than lay them off and further aggravate the unemployment situation,...in line with the new government's policy to build a just and humane society.³⁴

The Purge

At the end of 1986, an estimated 10,000 civil servants had been removed. Out of a total personnel force of 1.3 million persons, this was a drop in the bucket. How could it have wrought so much protest, demoralization and confusion?

First, this was the biggest removal yet: Marcos purged from 1972 to 1975 (and in trickles throughout the rest of Martial Law) but his victims were estimated only at around 3,000, certainly not more than 5,000.

Second, the axe fell on certain groups: CESOs, local government civil servants, personnel of the Ministries of Human Settlements, Local Government, Public Works and Highways, Environment and Natural Resources, Tourism; the National Food Authority, the Philippine Tourism Authority, other government corporations, to name just a few. As much as one-third of CESOs lost their positions; local and national personnel rosters changed overnight. The main targets of the purge could be identified by certain agencies or positions, but what made them deserve dismissal were not clear. Some agencies, like MHS and a few of the government firms, were recommended for abolition or privatization even before Marcos' regime ended; some, like the MPWH and MENR, were supposed to be snake-pits – but the rest were not. One also should not judge persons by their agencies. But honest and competent people were removed along with those rumored to be corrupt and obsequious to their superiors or to the Marcoses.

The agency differential seemed to be partly a function of the management background of the agency head. Politicians tended to remove large batches of personnel and replace them with "trusted newcomers" or political followers.³⁵ On the other hand, executives from the private sector, academics and promoted career officials tended to use the second and third options, or engage in a rational and open performance evaluation.

Third, the process of choosing who should be removed left much to be desired. In some agencies, like the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, a painstaking appraisal of the record of the employees was made, complete with documents analysis, feedback of supporters, subordinates and clients, and interviews of the civil servants themselves.³⁶ But in others, performance was laid aside in the search for political loyalty. In one MHS unit, employees were asked where they were during the People Power Revolution. One informant, who was at EDSA, felt her professional record spoke for itself, refused to answer the question, and lost her job. There were many others like her.

In others, any assessment process made was not discerned by employees nor was cause for their removal given. In the Office of the Prime Minister, employees were given separation notices effective after a month, "to enable (them) to train (their) replacement." Others were given mimeographed termination letters with their names hardly legible.

Fourth, the mere act of requiring people to submit courtesy resignations, even though the assessment process was professional and fair, was already destabilizing. In the Ministry of Health, 1,500 were asked for these resignations, but only 60 were accepted and ten, demoted. Those negatively affected were then only 4.7 percent of ranking personnel and 0.1 percent of total personnel force.

But insecurity went far beyond these percentages, because the 1,500 were mostly household heads who worried about their family's survival if they lost their jobs. At an average of 5.2 members per family, this accounted for 7,800 mouths wondering where the next meal was going to come from.

Employees spread fear as they awaited results of the assessment, which took over a month. By then, those who felt they had a greater chance in another agency had applied there, creating the spectacle of employees under threat in one agency getting jobs in a second, while its people won refuge in a third, which in turn eventually got new positions in the first agency. Meanwhile, those still waiting hardly did any work, lest they make a mistake and invite the axe on themselves.³⁷

Fifth, the purge galvanized employees to organize. There were two reasons for this: (a) people were removed in such big groups that reinforced anger overcame the shame; and (b) the civil servants believed the government claim of "democracy" and thought they could get justice if they howled. No one was dragged to a military camp for protesting.

Review under the Freedom Constitution

Proclamation No. 3 only provided a legal basis for personnel actions, the revolutionary fervor having immediately assumed legitimacy for a purge. However, protests were so loud that on May 28, the Aquino government felt the need to limit the grounds for removal to the following:

- (1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;³⁸
- (2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as

determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

- (3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
- (4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
- (5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.³⁹

E O 17 was well-meaning but the grounds it provided were so broad as to encompass even seemingly innocent acts. Moreover, the fact that most removals were couched in the form of acceptance of courtesy resignations made it technically impossible for employees to file appeals. Also, in spite of the "removal for cause" principle it espoused, civil servants continued to be dismissed without specifying the grounds for that action.⁴⁰

A central review committee undertook a thorough and fair appeals procedure. It required employees to file sworn statements and asked their superiors to explain their side at all. The delay was borne by the employees who forfeited their salaries during the period of appeal, even if they won the case. Only about 700 civil servants appealed to the review committee. A lawyer in the committee did not think it implied that the rest were for just cause. Rather, she pointed out various difficulties: the vagueness of the dismissal order (which made it difficult for the civil servant to counter the argument); the lack of lawyers to draw up the sworn statement; the lack of faith that they would be redressed; the lack of knowledge and the centralized nature of the review process (which was different from the usual civil service channels); and the fear that complaints would make the employees lose all benefits.

Most of the appeals were decided in the employees' favor. However, the committee did not have the power to compel their bosses for their reinstatement, making for a moral, but ultimately empty, victory.

The Aquino Purge in Comparative Perspective

The 1986-87 purge was not unique in the Philippines nor among countries under transitional regimes. A brief comparison to some of these places the event in perspective.

Other Philippine Purges. The purge of 1986 followed only two others in Philippine civil service history: that by Governor General Francis Burton Harrison in 1913, and by Marcos in 1972-75.

The first purge was undertaken through

enforced (sic) resignations, reductions of pay in the higher officers, the abolition of certain positions and the creation of conditions that were intolerable to many senior Americans in the service.⁴¹

As explained by Harrison, the move was necessary because

their (the American bureau chiefs') power had increased to such an extent that they had assumed an attitude of rivalry and antagonism toward one another, if not toward government itself;... their "prestige" was all-important, and they were generally inspired with a disbelief in the ability of Filipinos to carry on any important work in government.⁴²

This justification would anticipate that of the later Marcos and Aquino purges: that the bureaucracy was enjoying power for its own sake, and that it would not be able to concretize the philosophy of the new regime. It had, however, two major differences from the latter two. First, the policy spoken of was Filipinization, a progressive and necessary step in a soon-to-be independent country. Second, it managed to attain its objectives: at the end of the Harrison period, Americans had decreased from 29 to 4 per cent of the entire civil service.⁴³ Moreover, civil service rules for promotions and appointment continued to be observed for Filipinos.

The purges under Marcos were conducted in an atmosphere of threat: the summary dismissals introduced under PD No. 6; the requirement of courtesy resignations of everyone; and martial law itself. Yet there was a mitigating factor: they used the hierarchy in soliciting the list of personnel to be removed, providing them some sense of regularity and normalcy. Section heads listed person(s) they would recommend for removal; the list would be checked by the division chief, and so on up the line. The whole process almost had no air of confidentiality about it, although it was much faster than the fate of ordinary communications. In the end, the desire to obey one's superiors while maintaining smooth interpersonal relationships with everybody else produced a purge list that reflected those values. Although there were the occasional corrupt, inefficient and incompetent employees, the "purge" in some cases simply cleaned up the personnel rolls of deceased employees, those long retired, or otherwise separated from the service, long-time absentees. Others, by whimsy, removed persons they did not like by labelling them "notoriously undesirable," a notoriously difficult term to define.⁴⁴ The derision that followed the discovery of mistakes in the purge of 1975 was said to be responsible for the removal of the then-Executive Secretary and his chief aides. Also, the purge could be undone, if a person could get the proper connections.⁴⁵ Given the nature of martial law, no employee organizations turned up to plead the personnel's cause.

In many ways, Marcos' purge did not frighten the civil servants as much as Aquino's for one major reason: the patrons were already in place, and the civil servants knew how to work with them. By contrast, Aquino's people were an unknown quantity. But the purges were similar in their consequences: neither government managed to show through the process its vision of what the civil service should be. Both removed the corrupt as well as the honest, the lazy and inefficient along with the hard-working, the partisan with the politically neutral. Neither did Aquino's purge constitute de-Marcosification because many who were close to the deposed president or exemplifying his ways remained in place. Not for naught did Filipinos bring the term *balimbing* into the political vocabulary. A many-sided fruit in Aquino's trademark yellow, it was applied to Marcosistas who turned overnight into Coryistas.

Purging for Democracy in Other Settings. Can a purge ever work as a means of redemocratization? Clearly in Aquino's case it had not, since the aspiration to de-Marcosify and cleanse the bureaucracy was muddled in implementation. Misuse and abuse of office, corruption, unprofessional conduct or gross incompetence were superseded by extraneous criteria. Instead, pressures from political followers and distrust of or revenge against leftovers of Marcos-tainted institutions became reasons for removing some civil servants. Equally complained about was the retention of others who were known to have dishonored the service under the previous regime. That they were not removed revealed the guidelines effectively being followed in the purge; most of these were of the genre of particularistic considerations such as kinship or school ties.

The Aquino government has not been alone in failing in its purification objective. De-Nazification in Germany that had "begun with wholesale incriminations turned in the direction of wholesale exemptions and then ended in wholesale exoneration."⁴⁶ Japan's demilitarization also floundered.⁴⁷ One reason for the lack of success is similar to the Philippines: reformers in both countries were caught in the intricate web of human relationships that crossed authoritarian-democratic lines.⁴⁸ These produced arbitrary procedures, sympathy for targets, and easy availability of whitewashing documents.

One of the few governments that successfully undertook a purge was the Karamanlis regime in Greece. Its formula for "dejunatification" included a careful and specific pinpointing of priority criminal events and persons for indictment, the resort to existing legal procedures and open trials, and their speedy prosecution. That effectively responded to the people's desire for justice in terms of both punishing the guilty without making them objects of sympathy, and cleansing the military and civilian bureaucracies.⁴⁹ Closer home, the summary dismissals undertaken by Efren Plana as Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the Philippines in 1975, although undertaken under an authoritarian regime, were marked by such fairness that even dismissed employees continued to respect the man.⁵⁰ In other words, perhaps a purge can be acceptable even under a democratic regime, but only if the methods and substance of democracy are not shunted about in the process.

Reorganizing the Bureaucracy

General reorganization has occurred five times, from the Commonwealth to Marcos' democratic period, as a legislative power delegated to the President for a specified period of time. Reorganization has meant a structural overhaul to effect economy, eliminate duplication and create a streamlined organization. Each reorganization has attempted to decongest the office of the President, establish offices at regional levels to deconcentrate activities from the center, and strengthen the economic bodies of the bureaucracy, especially the planning agency. The fact that these became necessary to repeat after every five years or so attest to the continuing struggle of the executive, the legislature and the bureaucracy to change the distribution of power among them during and after reorganization.

The bureaucracy has grown tremendously since the turn of the century, when it was staffed by 4,316 people.⁵¹ Under the Americans, it expanded by an average

of 12 percent per annum, much faster than the general population, until 1935.⁵² With the transfer to self-government during the Commonwealth, civil servants increased from 22,411 in 1935 to 91,685 in 1946,⁵³ a mean annual increase of 28 percent. From Independence until the eve of Marcos' presidency, expansion continued, although at a somewhat decelerated pace, being "only" 21 percent annually.⁵⁴ Marcos' years as an elected president (1965-72) may be regarded as a model of restraint, as the bureaucracy increased by 3 percent per annum, half the rate of his already frugal predecessor, Diosdado Macapagal. Reorganization is supposed to decrease the size of the civil service. And indeed, between 1973 and 1974, when Marcos' Integrated Reorganization Plan took effect, there was a perceptible decrease of 8 percent. Unfortunately, the decrease was cancelled out after that. During the martial law years, the bureaucracy more than doubled, from 569,443 in 1973⁵⁵ to 1.3 million in 1985.⁵⁶ That represented an average annual increase of 11 percent, an acceleration not experienced since the early years of the Republic.

The structure has changed over time also. There were six functional departments when the civil service was organized in 1900. Three others were added at the start of the Commonwealth in 1935. With the formal grant of independence in 1946, the country was supposed to be able to make its own foreign policy, and the Department of Foreign Affairs was then created. When Aquino took over, there were 19 departments.⁵⁷ Meanwhile, public enterprises increased, from about 30 in the 1960s to three times that number by the 1980s. In addition, there are other units called authorities, administrations, offices, boards and commissions, which sometimes correspond to regular departments, at others to public enterprises.

The Process of Reorganization under Aquino

The government created the Presidential Commission on Governmental Reorganization (PCGR), as one of its first official acts.⁵⁸ Giving itself just one hundred days, PCGR worked through 30 survey teams composed of expert groups largely from the private sector. A three-day seminar was conducted in Manila to elicit the public's comments and suggestions. These were incorporated in the provisional report presented to the President on June 12, 1986.

The reorganization's exquisite timing ended there. It was not until August 13 or two months later that the Cabinet approved PCGR's recommended principles.⁵⁹ The PCGR drafted 54 executive orders before disbanding in December 1986. By then, only four reorganization executive orders had been signed. Seventeen others were signed in January 1987 but were not made public until after the May congressional elections.⁶⁰ As of December 1987, only three of 18 departments, one of two constitutional commissions, and twelve of 51 other offices (independent offices, public enterprises, etc.) had completed their reorganization.⁶¹

The slow pace of reorganization hints at the tumult that accompanied their processes and outcomes. Reorganization processes at agency and central levels seemed conflicting and confused. For instance, most heads created in-house task forces which in the beginning generally reported to the PCGR. The latter as overall consultants were to provide the comprehensive and integrative perspective to the whole process. However, with disagreements between its concept and that of many

agency heads, the products of these two teams evolved as parallel lines, never to meet.

Moreover, the hundred-day limit the PCGR gave itself was too cramped considering the need to study the organization, listen to the views of affected persons, get the plan into the Executive Secretary's pipeline and get it approved. PCGR's departure allowed the in-house team to carry out the reorganization process as it saw fit. Some followed the presidential wish for transparency and participation while others kept vital information closed to all but a small group.

Draft plans were unimplementable until they were signed by the President. Her first decisions did not show a clear preference to PCGR plans, an action which invited the agencies to draw up plans which departed from even the outlines of the reorganization body's work. With at least two plans to choose from,⁶² it became a question of who would have the greater access to the President or her Executive Secretary. In one case, an executive order was actually rescinded after the Department⁶³ of Budget and Management objected to the inclusion of one of its units. Turf and similar issues would replace the exalted guiding principles of PCGR.

Reorganization was complicated by the fact that it did not have an end-date. The 1987 Constitution itself recognized two reorganizations: that following its ratification, and the earlier one pursuant to Proclamation No. 3. For many employees, the first one was "the purge," while the second one was a purge in the guise of being "reorganized out" (that is, there is no position left for one in the new structure).

Many agencies also bore the brunt of frequent Cabinet changes⁶⁴ and the desire of each new head to put his own stamp on the organization. This resulted in some of those purged by the first department head to be reinstated and for those who were retained to be this time subject to termination. This also meant new changes in position titles or unit labels, a seemingly never-ending process that made an analyst claim that reorganization can become "institutionalized" and the country be

so obsessed with rearranging administrative structures... without half-realizing that these may not provide solutions ... and only result in some tension and instability.⁶⁵

More than structure, personnel repercussions of reorganization hogged center stage. Even as the government was celebrating its first hundred days, meetings were being held by employee organizations to inquire into the fairness, political neutrality and transparency of the overhaul. Because of this lobby, members of the Constitutional Commission in the draft they submitted in September 1986, felt constrained to include a transitory provision that ensured for career employees separated as a result of reorganization financial benefits and consideration for later employment in other agencies of government.⁶⁶

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) did not provide criteria for evaluating relative fitness of employees nor enjoin preference to permanent employees until September 2, 1986. In the same memorandum circular, it also set out a grievance procedure, and gave six months from the commencement of reorganization to finalize all placement actions. While it then required a placement committee in

each agency, it did not insist on representation of employees and CSC until Memorandum Circular No. 16, distributed a full year later (October 20, 1987).

The image of reorganization as the second wave of the purge activated even more employee organizations, resulting in mass leaves throughout the next twelve months. On September 18, 1987, the Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE) held a conference in the streets while the Civil Service Commission was celebrating its 87th anniversary and managed a bigger crowd (1,000 inside, 10,000 outside, by COURAGE's estimate).

The protests were joined by the Senate which passed a resolution proposing to the Executive a suspension of the reorganization until December 31, 1987. The President countered with an unnumbered memorandum on October 2, 1987, providing new guidelines for implementing the reorganization orders. Specifically, she voiced concern that the reorganization should be conducted expeditiously, but should also be "sensitive to (its) dislocating consequences," "most humane," and "open and transparent." She admonished executives that the review must adhere to due process and might include appeals to the Civil Service Commission. She required that all employees be informed of their reappointment or termination within three weeks of her memorandum and stipulated February 15, 1988 for the release of all separation benefits. These deadlines were not met, despite employee agitation.

On December 28, 1987, CSC sent letters of termination to its own employees effective January 7, 1988, or just a week after the notice. This was circulated by aggrieved employees to show how hopeless their situation had become, if CSC itself could so treat its own employees. The Senate Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization conducted public hearings on February 9 and 22, 1988. While mentioning that agency spokespersons assured the Committee that the process they followed was consultative, adhering to all guidelines and not productive of too much displacement, the following complaints of government employees were listed as the Committee's findings:

- (1) Lack of transparency and openness in the reorganization;
- (2) Inadequate representation in the Placement/Screening Committee;
- (3) Flagrant violations of guidelines provided by CSC and the President;
- (4) Lack of rationale and irregular conduct of placement and selection;
- (5) Violation of ban on hiring new personnel during election campaign periods;
- (6) Guises of removal or demotion (e.g., specifying such difficult qualifications that no one but a favored individual can fill them);
- (7) Inaction of CSC amidst violations of its guidelines and directives;

- (8) Placement of personnel dictated by political patronage and favoritism rather than merit and fitness; and
- (9) Negation of objectives of simplicity and economy (through the increase, rather than decrease, of positions and employees).

Note that the grievances focused on personnel-related actions and processes rather than on the structure of reorganization itself, except for the last point.

In view of these, the Senate again asked for the suspension of reorganization. This time, it drew a sharp rebuke from both the President and the Cabinet. Their official statement averred that "all the Cabinet men had invested so much blood, so much tears and sweat to reorganize their departments over a long and arduous period of time."⁶⁷ It then reiterated that "reorganization was not intended to dismiss people in government but rather to streamline and achieve administrative efficiency." It also claimed that the outcry had only come from those who were disadvantaged, rather than the general public.⁶⁸

The last point was at least not true. The new CSC Chairman (appointed February 2, 1988) had acknowledged the problems and "bad faith" lurking in some reorganizations.⁶⁹ Moreover, the first training program for new occupants of CES positions by the Development Academy of the Philippines (a unit under the Office of the President) also put the problem of reorganization in its agenda, recognizing implicitly that a lot of abuse had taken place in its name. More tellingly, the 1987 draft Philippine Development Report, an update of the Medium-Term Development Plan, said the following:

The lack of popular support to the government's reorganization program may be attributed to certain flaws in the reorganization plan, including its basic approaches and to the perceived distortions in the actual implementation, which resulted in complaints of undue displacement of personnel.⁷⁰

Assessing Reorganization

By the end of 1987, some structural changes have become evident in the bureaucracy. The policy of privatization has started slow; the President has approved the disposition of 86 public enterprises, the abolition of two and retention of 18. Still awaiting presidential sanction is the recommended privatization of seven, abolition of 39 and retention of 33. A hundred and six (106) others are under review.⁷¹

According to the Plan Update, the reorganization program covered 71 agencies of which only 14 were able to implement their plans by 1987. Six agencies, including two departments, were abolished, 66 had their functions transferred to other agencies, and several were merged into 15 agencies. A few of the new agencies in the last two groups are resurrections of the old and have been mentioned by some employee organizations as the means of removing personnel without giving up the powers and functions of the units.

Within each department, the main change has been the increase of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, a surprising development in a regime that started out by criticizing the gigantism and centralization of the Marcos bureaucracy.⁷² Under Marcos, there were at most two undersecretaries: the career person and the political deputy minister who was a member of the National Assembly. As of July 1987, undersecretaries have increased from 45 to 66, and assistant secretaries from 59 to 70. Most departments have three to six undersecretaries. In the field there is a greater effort to replicate the central office structure in the region (i.e., each central staff bureau now has a counterpart person or unit there). This has resulted in a perceptible top-heaviness at both central and field levels, raising questions about the commitment to decentralization.

On the personnel side, the bureaucracy has increased by 43,229 between 1985 and 1986 despite the lay-off of an estimated 10,000. (This compares with 10,909, the increase between 1984 and 1985.) The increase is accounted for primarily by career positions, and is greatest at the first level, followed by teacher positions and then by other second level personnel. Estimates of the total to be removed by the completed reorganization program are quite a range — from "a few hundreds according to agency spokespersons, to one-third, up to one-half of the bureaucracy, based from COURAGE and the Senate Committee. The former has already been belied by the fact that with reorganization only partially carried out, thousands have already left the service. However, reaching the estimate of 400,000 to 650,000 is unlikely, given current rates. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the process has become destabilizing, even for those not now in the "hit lists".

Despite these, I must not leave the impression that reorganization is always undesirable nor that no thoroughgoing but humane reorganization ever took place. For instance, the Department of Finance reorganized without problems, with its employees involved and each unit submitting its own plan.⁷³ Also, the original reorganization in the Department of Trade and Industry was greeted with many protests and gave birth to an employee organization. The Secretary later included that organization in the decision-making process and the program proceeded without further disruptions.⁷⁴ In both cases, some employees still lost their jobs but the overall fairness of reorganization was not questioned.

Employee organizations have even endorsed reorganization "if only to dismantle the vestiges of the dictatorship."⁷⁵ However, the process went on with very little conscious de-Marcosification. The new officials went by what they knew, which rounded to disparate tests of fitness and, in a personalistic society, questions of reliability. The latter were biased towards persons they were bringing into the service, as well as others already inside whom they trust or who could show, within a short period of time, such attitudes and abilities. In other words, the dispute about reorganization did not center on the program itself nor its acknowledged political stance, but the fact that it was operationalized in a manner that went against common notions of fairness and merit. It was assumed that persons who had dishonored the service by collaborating with Marcos in raping the ballot or bankrupting the treasury must go, but the bureaucracy looked for degrees of involvement (removal of decision makers rather than small fry, for example) or known criteria (such as fairness, in that all persons who did the same thing must be treated similarly).

Other Issues in the Regime-Bureaucracy Struggle

Wage Restructuring

Salaries in the civil service have always been notoriously low and inequitable. Constantino and Constantino⁷⁶ charge that the 1913 Filipinization policy was occasioned not by the colonials' belief in the natives' ability for self-government as much as an economizing measure: fewer Americans meant a smaller wage bill, since they would not work for the substandard wages Filipinos received. However, protests were not organized until 1932,⁷⁷ long after labor unions in private firms had done so. The efforts paid off; a Government Survey Board was created in 1936 to correct a structure that paid different wages for substantively similar work. Its report resulted in the Salary Standardization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 402, September 13, 1938), patterned after the US Classification Act of 1923. However, the Board's recommendations were based on inadequate data and led to inequities in salary adjustments and demoralization.⁷⁸

A new pay plan was promulgated in 1947, but

no sooner was the plan adopted, when various professional and employee groups agitated and obtained separate, special legislation upgrading their salaries.⁷⁹

Later, the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602, April 6, 1951) upgraded about 43 per cent of national employees, but pay rates of those on or above that wage were not increased, resulting in a still different kind of inequity.

The most thoroughgoing position and salary reform was undertaken in 1953. A California management consulting firm produced a plan classifying 183,000 positions into 2,300 classes and 239 occupational groups. With US technical assistance available, Filipinos no longer needed to copy American laws by themselves; they could pay Americans to do it for them. Although they trained Filipino staff, the boldest of whom questioned them at every turn, the resulting classification showed "ample evidence that ...the classification and pay plans reflected the preferences, if not biases, of the American consultants."⁸⁰ The WAPCO plan (after the agency created to implement it, the Wage and Position Classification Office) met vocal opposition immediately. Despite that, Congress enacted it in 1955. However, it heeded complaints of various agencies and employee organizations and passed several laws exempting them from WAPCO coverage, sometimes resulting in subordinates getting higher pay than their superiors. Moreover, from 1963 on, employees of government corporations performing proprietary functions were allowed to bargain collectively, removing this sector from WAPCO and leading to the spiraling of their salary levels.⁸¹

Any effort to correct the hodge-podge nature of wage "standardization" drew vehement opposition from agencies and employee organizations that were already exempt. Such a move did not prosper until Martial Law, when Marcos put everyone – including labor unions – back into the WAPCO ambit. This did not stop public enterprises from giving their employees fat allowances in addition to the standard civil service pay, and individual agencies and groups continued to get exemptions through special presidential decrees.

Thus, when the Aquino government was installed, salaries were inadequate on several counts. Generally low, they did not follow the principle of equal pay for equal work. In the departments, the hiring rate for the first level was ₱6,562 per annum while department secretaries received ₱100,000 – a ratio of 1: 15. (Taking into account the cost of living allowances of the rank and file, the ratio would improve to 1: 10.) The gap was worse in reality since top officials received other benefits in cash or in kind. The pay differential between the regular civil service and public enterprises was also large.

The Aquino leadership declared the rates "abysmal" and showed concern towards changing them. However, it had inherited a tottering economy and low government revenues. Besides, it deemed the bureaucracy gigantic and saw "trimming the fat" as a necessary prelude to increasing wages. With its hands so tied, it put the purges and reorganization ahead of the wage agenda, thus dangling a very strong stick with hardly a carrot in sight.

The Aquino timetable would be upset by several factors. First, Marcos had announced wage increases on the eve of the snap presidential elections. This smacked of blatant electioneering, but civil servants welcomed it not as a means of gaining their loyalty but as a long overdue reward.⁸² However, it was not implemented; thus there were supposed to be pending increases at the time of regime turnover.

The new government refused to honor Marcos' election ploy and even ordered the repayment to the government of any amount paid in compliance with it. But the pressure was so great that in July 1986, it gave a ten percent increase to all employees except those on special pay plans.

Second, the drafters of the new Constitution, appalled by the low wages of the highest officials in the land, had increased their respective salaries.⁸³ The figures constituted a 300 percent raise for the President, slightly lower rates for the others. The Constitution also required that at the earliest possible time, the salary scales of other government personnel should be increased.⁸⁴

Accordingly, in March, 1987, within a month of Ratification, the government started to pay out the constitutionally ordained salaries. Simultaneously, it also increased, by around 80 percent to 120 percent, the compensation of positions at the Cabinet and Career Executive Service level. Meanwhile, it decreed a 10 percent increase for all other employees, on the ground that it could not afford to give everyone the same increases as those in the top positions. While a little arithmetic would show this to be true, it also meant that the regime had put the welfare of those already far above the poverty line ahead of the thousands of its extremely underpaid civil servants. Its other justification – that it must attract the best into the public service – fueled the already heavy resentment against newcomers from the private sector. Specifically, these were mentioned by those who felt victimized by the previous regime and now found that those who did not pay their dues during that period have become the first to reap the dividends.

A third factor was the swift passage of increases of base pay and other benefits to the military, following the failed coup of Gregorio Honasan and his well-

publicized alibi that it was only a move to dramatize the poor conditions of the soldier. The joint executive-legislative rush on behalf of the military drew this sharp retort from WAGES (Wage Adjustment for Government Employees Solidarity, a federation of five organizations of civil servants⁸⁵):

We do not begrudge (sic) the fact that soldiers are indeed underpaid. But we, the more numerous civilian component of the civil service, are just as underpaid and demoralized. Do we have to do a Honasan-act to get as much attention?⁸⁶

The government has responded with three across-the-board increases. However, other moves had favored certain groups over others. The most resented are the increases for CESOs, political officials and the military. Perhaps the least controversial were those given to public school teachers who had traditionally been the lowliest of civil servants and who won an additional 20 percent increase only after massive mass leaves in 1986 and 1987 (supported by private-sector labor unions and militant students). The Alliance of Health Workers has engaged in similar mass actions, and also has gotten the ear of the Department of Health. About 20 other groups or agencies have received increases without mass protests, courtesy of influential heads or sympathizers in Malacanang. Unfortunately, unlike teachers and physicians, these do not represent popular causes and have become, like the soldiers, bones of contention among civil servants themselves.

Thus on the wage issue, the Aquino government has not endeared itself to the bureaucracy. Salaries remain low, particularly at lower levels; the lowest pay in the national government at the end of 1987 was only ₱ 1,250 a month, including allowances (with the poverty line at ₱ 2,500). Equity also remains a problem: the rank and file vis-a-vis CESOs, elective and constitutional officers, the military versus the civilian, specific occupational groups against each other. The 1987 ratio between the top and bottom levels of the bureaucracy was 1:24 (compared to Marcos' 1:15); including base pay and cost of living allowances, it would be 1:13 in 1987 and 1:10 in 1985. Faced with pressures from employee organizations and also from its own executives who must manage demoralized employees, the present government has responded with piecemeal answers that have not raised the lowest salaries to satisfactory levels nor shown social justice to its employees.

Belatedly, in early 1988, it ordered the Department of Budget and Management to prepare an overall salary standardization plan; belated because it was made only after it had made its own contributions to the pell-mell rather than before it opened itself to accusations of unfairness. How well the DBM will stand up to pressures the President and her Cabinet in toto could not withstand is a subject of (negative) speculation.

Employee Organization and Participation

Every bureaucracy is hierarchical and, almost by definition, centralized and authoritarian. In the Philippines, this is reinforced by a strongly authoritarian society, with its paternal supremacy and unquestioning obedience and loyalty to superiors.

The civil service would exacerbate the authoritarian tendency with its emphasis on promotion by seniority and unwillingness to make decisions outside a narrow band of discretion. As it matured, the bureaucracy attempted to fight this tendency in some ways, and to enhance it in others. While still very hierarchical, Filipino civil servants are distinctly less formal and more egalitarian in their superior-subordinate relations than their colleagues in other Asian countries, a legacy of their American mentors. The US also exported techniques of human relations and participatory management into the Philippines, with mixed results. By the mid-1950s, staff meetings were a norm in all offices. These were supposed to be open and critical discussions of important official business. However, many such meetings quickly became lecture sessions by the boss, with little employee participation. Employee organizations were more attractive earlier since, unlike staff meetings, they did not include one's superiors. As already mentioned, the first such organizations surfaced in 1932, when they agitated for wage increases. They then lived quiet lives, if they survived at all, unless there were threats to the already fragile benefits they were enjoying. Thus, the frenzied activities following the promulgation of new salary plans. They won a few other victories: rare housing plans, special allowances, amendment of laws regulating their profession, and so on.

The tendency to become social clubs was encouraged by Martial Law when the powers of labor unions and employee organizations were clipped. However, before the authoritarian period ended, some organizations had begun to flex their muscles. The Philippine Public School Teachers Association and the Alliance of Concerned Teachers, otherwise ideologically different, both pushed for salary increases, practically inventing the technique of mass leaves.

With Cory Aquino's ascendancy, there was a quietude, until the thunderbolt of Proclamation No. 3 and the purges. Then, affected employees got together, and such groups as LINGKOD of National Food Authority⁸⁷ were born. Using the Aquino slogan of People Power, they first sought to dialogue with the new bosses and only later were there open protests and charges and counter-charges of bad faith.

Employee organizations were given an ambivalent boost in the 1987 Constitution which had three major provisions on the topic. The first provided

The right of the people, including those in the public and private sectors, to form unions... for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.⁸⁸

The second upheld "the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law."⁸⁹ The third, specific to the civil service, said simply:

The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.⁹⁰

The lack of mention of other employee rights has been interpreted as an attempt to limit those of civil servants, a meaning sustained by a reading of the Commission proceedings.

Despite this, and because of the removals, low wages, and their lack of involvement in decisions on these, employees have continued to organize and to dramatize their demands through various forms of work stoppage.

CSC declared in April 1987 that the constitutional provisions have been "subject to premature reproach by some government employees." It then warned that employees who stage mass action resulting in temporary stoppage or disruption of public service will face administrative sanctions.⁹¹ The teachers had heard a similar warning from the Secretary of Education.

Nevertheless, worker unrest continued, aggravated by charges of harassment by management. President Aquino responded with Executive Order No. 180 (June 1, 1987) which provided guidelines for self-organization by government employees.

The organizations viewed the Executive Order as unsatisfactory, particularly because it did not provide for employee representation in the Public Sector Labor-Management Council, the regulator and implementor of that Order. Also, they were disappointed that as a lawmaker, the President did not broaden the activities allowed to government employee organizations. Instead, she stuck to the existing law and thus did not even restore to public enterprise unions the right to strike.

EO 180 has not stopped organizations from campaigning for membership and continuing with protests and strikes under different guises. Meanwhile, in May 1988, CSC announced a draft Civil Service Code which gives organizations broader powers, including, for those in certain agencies, the right to strike.

Coping with Corruption

Purges, reorganization and wage policies have all been justified as means of fighting the corrupt image of the post-Independence civil service. Traditional personalism and patronage and the Spanish heritage of public office as economic investment were legitimated during the Japanese occupation when sabotage and stealing from its puppet government were hailed as patriotism. Justifying the use of public office for private gain, these values were cited again when into a war-damaged economy stepped the new independent government holding all the keys—to the extent the United States allowed it—to economic reconstruction and production. The political leadership and the bureaucracy then became eagerly courted as gatekeepers for licenses, quotas or services. All succeeding regimes rose and fell on the issue of graft and corruption, among other shortcomings.

Government over time continued to be a revenue collector, a regulator of economic activity, a provider of social and administrative services and a direct business competitor, but also an actor in bigger and wider areas of each of these. Corruption proceeded apace, starting as after-hours pastimes of individual personnel and becoming, as gains became brighter and risks less, syndicates existing parallel to the formal organization. With more effective norms of merit and rewards, they may be headed by the agency chief or otherwise fearfully tolerated by him.

Most civil servants probably steered clear of systemic corruption, out of moral compunction, lack of opportunity, untrustworthiness (from the view of the syndicate) or timidity. But because syndicates existed all over government, because few cases of whistle-blowing ever prospered (and only when they included only small fry), and because most presidents and politicians were suspected of corruption, the stereotype of a public official was always that of a person stealing from the public treasury. That was exacerbated under Martial Law when, with concentrated power, Marcos cut off the corruption enterprises of rival national politicians and provincial lords while legislating benefits for himself and his favored friends.⁹²

Enter Corazon Aquino who exemplifies for many the "lead modest lives" rule for public officials in the new Constitution. According to the Secretary of the Cabinet, she has never intervened in any contract, loan or appointment of lower-level officials.⁹³ That statement is expected of a cabinet man; what is remarkable is that it is believed by the audience, whether it be a group of government employees or hard-boiled business executives.

Aside from the moral leadership of the President and the appointment of many persons known for their probity and courage, her government has taken several steps in its campaign against corruption.

First, the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created to retrieve the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates. The extent to which he was helped by institutions and individuals in making appear legitimate patently criminal – or at least, dishonest or unfair – actions seemed so far-reaching that it has threatened to engulf the entire economy.⁹⁴ Thus, PCGG's broad powers of sequestration intimidated many firms.

Meanwhile, the exuberance – and sometimes, the abuse – of its agents, many of them volunteers without enough knowledge of government rules or procedures caused even initial supporters to be wary of "Cory's avenging angels." These problems have tended to overshadow the Commission's otherwise remarkable accomplishments: the perspicacious sleuthing and detailed documentation of the Marcos cache in the Philippines, United States and Europe; the generation of international cooperation in this search, and the new legal doctrines that may henceforth deter other greedy dictators; and the return to the national treasury of billions of pesos, a big part of which has been earmarked for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

Second, the new Constitution has limited presidential power and possible abuse, provided for modes of preventing and checking the occurrence of corruption, and included "betrayal of the public trust" as an impeachable offense. For local governments, it allowed for the possibility of recall, following its 1973 predecessor.

Third, the Cabinet-level Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA) was created in May 1987, following public criticisms about a lack of official response to the continuation of corruption. Departing from the failed centralized strategy of previous administrations,⁹⁵ PCPEA has designated agency liaison officers. In line with this, the President made each agency head personally

responsible for the integrity and accountability of his office, in effect decentralizing graftbusting.

PCPEA views corruption as a managerial issue and works towards increasing its risks and reducing its benefits.⁹⁶ For most of its short life, PCPEA has concentrated on streamlining procedures, deregulation and increasing transparency of government operations. Unfortunately, action officers themselves complain that while the positive approach may indeed deliver services, it has not managed to stop corruption.

The next move was clear: enforcement of anti-corruption laws, among the strictest in the world.⁹⁷ The government then came up against several managerial problems:

- (1) The PCPEA Secretariat lacked personnel to follow up on the reports and problems of 39 action officers who had filed 1,102 cases, and had managed to have dismissed or suspended only a dismal 18 percent of those involved.⁹⁸
- (2) The *Tanodbayan* (Ombudsman) had filed only 21 percent of 379 complaints with the courts as of the end of 1987. This was due both to its lack of personnel and its overcentralization. Only 25 percent of the cases involved people in Manila, but sworn statements, depositions and documents had to be brought there.⁹⁹
- (3) The Constitution divided the existing office of the *Tanodbayan* into an Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. The vagueness of the powers of the sitting *Tanodbayna* made it difficult for him to act vigorously on any case.

Fourth, some ministries embarked on systems improvement. They cleaned up purchasing units, contracting procedures and other rich sources of graft. The Ministry of Health (MOH)¹⁰⁰ reported after the first 100 days that it had saved about ₱13 million; others claimed the same feat without specifying amounts. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation undercut the fixer by charging extra fees for same-day processing of visa extensions, and then putting the proceeds into a salary augmentation fund. Moreover, it recognized exemplary employees in weekly flag ceremonies, and gave small cash bonuses. These never matched previous corruption "takes" but they were legal and ego-boosting.¹⁰¹

Filipinos have responded warmly to these overtures. They sent the President and department heads thousands of letters – complaints about specific officials or employees, advice on how to fight corruption, voluntarism for the cause. Initially, people's organizations served as disinterested brokers between the citizens and the agency (as contrasted to fixers or "ten-percenters"), relaying complaints to the agency and information to the clients; became public representatives to bidding committees, conducted training programs, or monitored delivery of services. However, few have survived to 1988; their demise may be traced partly to the problem of maintaining euphoria in an institutionalizing workaday world. More than that, however, is the disillusionment of finding new or recycled officials showing a Marcosian capacity to abuse, misuse or profit from their possession of or proximity to power.¹⁰²

Some explanations for the continuation of abuse and graft are traceable to the Aquino government. First is the President's own disinclination against using power unless forced to do so. Her honesty has not been matched by the political will to punish the corrupt. She has avoided direct confrontation with erring officials, despite rising complaints and even documented reports. Moreover, others remain untouched.

Second, enforcement of both preventive and prosecutory measures is missing. The problem with the latter is shown by PCPEA's frustrations. In prevention, the existing requirement is to compare the net worth of officials before entry and at the time of departure, but the Aquino government has not been strict about its submission at both crucial times.

Third, the government seems too concerned with the past. Criticisms continue to be deflected to the Marcos period. PCGG's efforts at getting Marcos' wealth back were not matched by public accounting of what were seized when the Aquino team came in and procedures were not followed to ensure accountability for the assets and revenues the whole government had since collected and expended.

Fourth, it appears more worried about corruption in the civil service than with that in the political leadership. Implicit trust was placed on high-ranking newcomers and returning politicians while pre-auditing and similar controls were reinstated to straightjacket the bureaucracy. The managerial approach to battling corruption focuses on the errors of lower-level employees at a time when they are already beset by threats of removal. Yet they have not been given, by example, clear guidelines of the kind of behavior they should exemplify and the kind of punishments they would receive if they strayed. As it is, civil servants again feel that the hunt is again only for the small fry. Amidst bureaucratic instability, this has resulted in more inflexibility and less innovations in the service.

Other problems may be brought about by the new political context. The restoration of the legislature has put in place rival power centers to the presidency. First, Congress may enact laws that depart from presidential policy preferences. They may also lend a sympathetic ear to problems of the bureaucracy with the executive and investigate conditions in that branch. As the newly revived legislature flexes its muscles, there are inevitable clashes with the executive where a bureaucracy may take sides, sometimes with its own beleaguered boss, at others against this perceived oppressive master. At such points, the focus of bureaucratic accountability may be muddled as the representatives of the people and the head of government point its activities in different directions.

In the second place, members of Congress intervene in bureaucratic affairs, not only in their formal role as legislators or investigators, but as politicians in behalf of their constituents, even beyond the bounds of propriety. Some of the rumored corruption may be such political interference in personnel appointments or contracts, with civil servants caught in the pressures rather than actively participating in the transaction. To their credit, both Houses have drawn rules to police their members. In addition, the Senate in its first Session has passed on third reading a bill that establishes ethical standards for both bureaucrats and political offi-

There are also now more corruption-watchers outside the bureaucracy. Although anti-graft NGOs have largely ceased operation, the church has continued its interest, and mass media have remained on the trail. Investigative reporting is coming of age in the country, although agencies are still secretive about public records and some news items still get published without endeavors to get both sides.

The Bureaucracy and Other Societal Forces

The Military and the Civil Service

Two government institutions increased in power during Martial Law: the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy, which together make up the Philippine civil service. While I am primarily concerned with the civilian force, its relationship with the military and the contrast of the treatment these two organizations received from the Aquino government bear on its struggle with the leadership, and its movement towards democracy.

The authoritarian side of Philippine bureaucracy, already evident in its obsequiousness to superiors, was further developed by increasing militarization beginning in 1972. Retired officers had always been welcome in civilian agencies, and military administrative technology (task forces, staff and line distinctions, PPBS), have easily penetrated the organizational style of its civilian counterpart. With martial law, more military officers, retired or in active duty, entered the civilian force, edging out regular career personnel. In addition, the authoritarian government resorted to the military in their capacity as soldiers in the prosecution of civilian programs. They were used to settle landgrabbing problems, labor-management conflicts, squatter eviction and other protests by the underprivileged, substituting them for non-violent alternatives which the civil service was then developing.

In the beginning, the new government recalled the military from civilian duty. Aquino's stirring "welcome home, my soldiers," the April 1986 speech to graduates of the Philippine Military Academy, proclaimed the military role in a democratic government as under civilian authority. That did not stifle some officers' desire to be at centerstage. In the first 18 months of her rule, they attempted several coups. This pressure, and other more covert ones, resulted in political leaders leaning over backwards to accommodate their main enemy when they were still "The Opposition." The swift passage of the law increasing soldiers' pay, the retirement of all officers as soon as they are of age,¹⁰⁴ the elevation of Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos to the civilian position of Secretary of National Defense immediately after his retirement -- all bespeak a reluctance to stir up military anger and a desire to consolidate her initially feeble hold on the armed forces. In its second year, moreover, it did not continue to keep military officers from civilian tasks. They seem to be more visible now, especially in the Department of National Defense (other newly retired, and thus "civilian" generals joining Ramos as top officials), the Bureau of Customs and various public enterprises.

Meanwhile, the absence of prosecution of human rights violations of the Marcos -- and Aquino -- regimes despite the creation of the Presidential Commission on

Human Rights (PCHR) and its later establishment as an independent constitutional body, the aggressive policy against Communist rebels in the countryside, and the endorsement of citizen vigilante groups¹⁰⁵ seem to suggest that it was not the soldiers who came home, but Cory Aquino who had come around to the thinking of the military.

The bureaucracy has received no similar kid-glove treatment. The reasons for the contrast are not hard to find. First, the military has arms and the decisive capacity for toppling the government. Meanwhile, the power of the bureaucracy has lain in its capacity to stall decisions rather than to make them.

Second, the military is relatively more irreplaceable than the civil service, particularly since Aquino rode to power on a revolution of unarmed cause-oriented groups, hardly an alternative liberation army. Military members are, however, possible substitutes to civil servants; many of them in fact, did join the government and accomplished the purge or benefited from it.

What exacerbates the feeling of injustice of civil servants is that Marcos had intervened in the recruitment and promotion of military officials more than in the civil service which he left largely to the discretion of his proven loyal ministers. Many then felt that they would deserve the purge only after the military has been similarly cleansed. But the brass have taken care of their own and recommended lenient punishments even for soldiers involved in coup attempts.

The government has taken note of the resentment belatedly. In September 1987, it convened a small group of civil servants, academics and public relations experts on the issue of how to communicate with the bureaucracy. Although the meeting was quite candid and produced several proposals, it was never followed up.

In early 1988, the President herself went to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to dialogue with the personnel there. DPWH is a notorious agency and the act of reaching out to it was a winner. It was the closest thing civil servants have ever gotten to "welcome home, my soldiers." Nevertheless, DPWH was not that central an agency and the President's presence there was not felt throughout the bureaucracy.

Popular Participation and the Bureaucracy

Since Independence, the bureaucracy has increased its capacity to accept popular pressures. Community development (CD) became a focal program under Ramon Magsaysay (1953-57) by which civil servants sought to draw out people's felt needs and self-reliance.¹⁰⁶ It was later shown that CD was part of the counter-insurgency thrust engineered by the CIA,¹⁰⁷ and thus was aimed not so much at unleashing popular forces as mobilizing them for government's predetermined goals and America's long-term interests. Nevertheless, some of its forebears like community schools and the cooperative movement had genuine concern for the grassroots, and most CD workers saw themselves as facilitators of the people's will, concretizing the rhetoric of the program. Before long, the agriculture, health and social welfare departments had their own village organizations, all using in some form the CD methodology.

Paradoxically, participatory techniques would blossom under the authoritarian regime. Some use was formalistic. Village brigades – copied from China – were instructed to be formed under the Ministry of Human Settlements. Like the village council which Marcos had earlier transformed from a local government into a mere administrative arm of the center, the brigades were units to prepare people to accept government-ordained dole-outs.

Despite this recentralizing thrust, some agencies developed authentic participatory techniques. For instance, the National Irrigation Administration developed community organizations for their communal irrigation systems,¹⁰⁸ the Ministry of Agriculture for agricultural production, the Ministry of Health for primary health care, and so on. Some of these were at the instance of foreign funding agencies – participation having become an international fad by the late 1970s – but many communities rose above these artificial beginnings to actually use these organizations as tools for upliftment and empowerment.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, pockets of the civil service learned to first appreciate and then to become convinced that acting on the basis of citizen demands was a superior way of service delivery.

It was a lesson that would put them at odds with the authoritarian government. Community participation was fine as long as it enhanced the democratic image of the dictatorship. But once they went beyond the facade, dedicated community organizers among civil servants became targets of harassment – and worse – by the military. By the end of the Marcos regime, community participation in the government had come full-circle: from a tool of counter-insurgency and the CIA, it now had people-oriented civil servants tagged as subversives and suspected as linked to the insurgent New People's Army.¹¹⁰

A government installed by people power would be expected to emphasize popular participation. Under Aquino, it would have two main types: (a) community organization (CO) created as an adjunct of a government agency; and (b) CO started independently of government.

The first type includes such disparate organizations as the *Alsa Masa*, a vigilante arm of the Department of National Defense, and the People's Economic Councils, composed of entrepreneurs and merchants in several local areas. The former has been denounced by human rights groups for using terror in its drive against communism; the latter spread the gospel of free enterprise to the grassroots. It is ironic that the participatory initiatives of the new government tend to be identified with the Right, especially since they join programs started by Marcos, some of which were dominated by social concerns and more leftist inclinations.

The second group is composed of supportive cause-oriented groups which wanted to dedicate their idealism and revolutionary fervor in the service of the new government. Some of them volunteered to the President or the agencies for various tasks. An innovation was their recruitment to serve as monitors of government projects, for instance in the Community Employment and Development Program, constructing public works for emergency employment. Others were drafted to assist reorganization teams, bidding committees or in streamlining procedures. They had mixed reception in the bureaucracy. If they came with the wave of

newcomer takeovers, they were ignored or resented by the civil service at large. However, those with a track record in relating to bureaucrats or in smoothing bureaucracy-client frictions were regarded as allies.

The Aquino Government, Philippine Bureaucracy and Democracy

On the eve of Aquino's triumph, the bureaucracy showed elements of a collaborator-institution to the dictatorship: it was authoritarian, militarized, unresponsive, graft-ridden and partisan. However, many civil servants were also victims of the regime: harassed for their participatory and service-oriented style, forced to violate norms of profession and conscience, and pushed into partisan activities. They were neglected by Marcos in the distribution of rewards, and disdained by the larger society. There were also the "neutrals" who were largely unaffected by Marcos' drive to personally dominate the bureaucracy: personnel who would work under any regime and accept all orders of any superior, who would be inefficient and inflexible or, on the other hand, dedicated and hardworking.

Thus it must be emphasized that at the end of Marcos' regime, the bureaucracy was huge but growing more slowly than before, modernized yet inefficient, professionalized but formalistic. It was politicized in both positive and negative senses, that is, committed to itself through corruption, to the regime in its electioneering and servile obedience, and to the people, in its genuine participatory and decentralizing methods. It was a complex system that needed to be analyzed thoroughly before one could recognize which parts had profited from dictatorship, which had been oppressed and which – whatever the nature of its relationship with Marcos – could be harnessed for present goals.

The Aquino government chose to reform the civil service through summary dismissals, early retirement, reorganization, use of non-governmental groups, exhortation, and various incentives. Although combining positive and negative mechanisms in conception, they appeared to be strongly punitive as a totality and in their implementation.

De-Marcosification and Democracy

A *ressentiment* strategy has strong democratizing features. First, the crux of Andrew Jackson's "throw the rascals out" was to fulfill the vision for which the leadership was voted into office. Such responsiveness he did not expect from permanent professionals uncommitted to the new government's covenant with the people. Therefore, replacing and punishing them became a necessary means for that positive end.

The Aquino team's distrust of the civil service because of the latter's Marcosian ancestry, and its judgment of current personnel and organization as poor exemplars of bureaucratic virtues, made what even it considers a "painful" overhaul seems necessary. However, the pruning and change processes and their results did not exemplify its vision either.

Second, during Martial Law, the bureaucracy grew in power at the expense of other political institutions. Thus, balancing was required to restore the importance of other democratic institutions.¹¹¹ This meant a relatively weaker civil service which could not dictate over the new legislature or overwhelm the growing popular forces. This rationale, however, ignored the fact that the bureaucracy had not been totally authoritarian. In addition, other political bodies can develop without need to weaken the civil service.

Third, the new government's approach to bureaucratic reform fitted in with Aquino's own definition of a democratic presidency as limited and subject to the free flow of divergent ideas. She sees her office as mediator of conflicts and reconciler of warring parties, rather than as source of overall direction. As she allows the judiciary and the legislature their independence, so she has given her cabinet officials leeway in undertaking their jobs. This is a new approach in a country inured to a strong presidency. In the case of the bureaucracy, this has translated to sending purge-minded heads belated reminders of criteria for humaneness and fairness, allowing them their own style in changing their organization, procedures, personnel, or wages – generally, then, courting protests instead of preventing them through full and early articulation of the overall rationale and acceptable methodology for the activities.

The resort of a new regime to *ressentiment* politics is not without precedent. A direct attack on the former ruler's remnants has been a popular option both for governments leading into authoritarianism¹¹² or for newly installed democrats.¹¹³ This, despite the fact that removals and purification have almost always failed.¹¹⁴

It might be argued that the chosen approach had misread the Philippine bureaucracy. Despite Marcos' changes, it has remained subordinate, adaptable to work for whoever is in power.¹¹⁵ Aware of that bureaucratic trait, Peru's authoritarian government under Velasco did not bother with changing the civil service; it simply went on with its radical agrarian reform and expected the government personnel to implement it, which to a large extent, they did.¹¹⁶ Nicaragua's Sandinista regime did not purge either, except for the abolition of the hated National Guard. Instead, it pushed for a more democratic administration, by encouraging the development of parallel popular organizations.¹¹⁷

Standards for Democratic Reform of the Bureaucracy

The struggle of the Philippine political leadership with the bureaucracy may be evaluated based on its standards for administrative reform. They include the redefinition of the scope of government, decentralization, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. I will deal only with the first three since democratizing effects of administrative criteria depend on program content. I will also add two others that have been central to both my definition of democracy and the government's own pronouncements: participation and equity.

The Scope of Government. Despite my reservations about privatization, it must be pointed out that the government has not pursued this task with any dispatch or tough-mindedness. Progress has been slow, and reorganization itself has resulted in an enlarged government. In fact, it appears that while some parts of the civil

service are being cut and transferred to the private sector, an opposite flow may be taking place. Though smaller, that trend is influential, with former corporation executives and their aides joining the public sector, and business administration schools entering the field of governmental management. Meanwhile, from the Left, cause-oriented organizations have become more involved in the prosecution or evaluation of government projects. Both processes will eventually change the civil service, but whether they will push it to be more responsible to the poor majority or whether the private-sector's profit motive will overwhelm its traditional service orientation cannot be predicted as yet.

Decentralization. "Bringing the government closer to the people" as a slogan has also been taken up by the regime. However, actual efforts to decentralize the bureaucracy have been meager. The top-heaviness of the resulting reorganization and the increase of central controls have not been counterbalanced by more grants of local autonomy which are still at the talking stage.

Accountability. Accountability cannot thrive under an atmosphere of distrust, which both the bureaucracy and the political leadership still feel for each other. The government has not reached out to the bureaucracy in the same way it has welcomed home the soldiers. And civil servants, battered by dismissals, low wages and unending reorganization¹¹⁸ pay lip-service to their political responsibility but insist this can flower only after their working conditions are improved.¹¹⁹ Exhortations towards ethics in the civil service, without concomitant force applied against violations, especially those perpetrated by top political officials, make for well-applauded speeches, but few behavioral changes. Moreover, the drive towards transparency when applied to employees' conduct was not matched by a similar openness when the leaders were deciding the employees' fate. This is a danger sign: a similar gap between rhetoric and practice started the disenchantment of the bureaucracy with the predecessor-regime.

Equity and Fairness. The Aquino government's approach to civil service reform manifested several inequities. The wage strategy was so flawed it had to order a new across-the-board standardization of pay. However, fairness problems were also evident in other areas, including the differential treatment of the military vis-a-vis the bureaucracy, the focus on low-level corruptors, and the process of dismissing and retaining employees. A strong stand in favor of the poorer and less powerful, not applied to the bureaucracy, seems to reflect a similar inability to substantiate democracy in the larger society.

Participation. "People participation and people-orientation" were supposed to be the "First Axiom of this Administration."¹²⁰ Again, in dealing with the bureaucracy, even punitive methods might have been appreciated if the government had followed the democratic methods it was verbally espousing. However, its commitment to people power stopped short of granting its own employees their voice in decision-making, and participation by civil servants was "prematurely reproached" instead. This is similar to its treatment of the peasants and the urban poor, though different from its dealings with middle-class participants of cause-oriented groups or the business sector in the People's Economic Councils. Again, it raises questions about the road the Aquino government is taking towards substantive democracy.

The Aquino Government-Civil Service Struggle: What Next?

I would not want to end this paper with heavy pessimism. Democratizing a bureaucracy has never been an easy task, and it is perhaps harder when the new government fails to see that authoritarianism had not completely robbed the civil service of some redeeming features or that its democracy is maintaining some authoritarian styles. Yet the situation is not hopeless: the political leadership is coming around to recognize some of the positive characteristics of the bureaucracy and has accepted the validity of some of its complaints and methods.

Perhaps the single best change is demilitarization. While many (too many?) military officials continue to serve in the civil service, the use of the armed forces in social programs has ceased. What has remained, however, is the perceived second class status of the civilian relative to the military institution. In this, the move of employee organizations to disrupt the flow of government services may be seen as a functional equivalent of the military's gun, as means of forcing the leadership to recognize the bureaucracy's worth.

Another asset is the openness of the political leadership to dialogue. This accords with the President's reverence for democratic procedures; this is not a government set in concrete. However, the process would be more productive had dialogues been scheduled before, rather than after, crises. As it was, employees were heard only after mass protests. At the same time, discussions generally take place at the instance of the bureaucracy, suggesting that the opening of communication lines is not an inborn trait, but has been nurtured by the bureaucratic struggle.

The dialogues also suggest a capacity to accept mistakes and learn from them. This is evident from the plans for a new salary standardization system, the drive for stronger enforcement of anti-corruption laws, and the coming revision of the Civil Service Code.

One should also note that the current struggle takes place in the context of the development of other political institutions. The Senate, particularly, has played a key role in attempting to redress employee grievances and put ethical standards high on the agenda. Mass media have publicized both sides of the regime-bureaucracy question while undertaking its role of keeping the public informed. People's organizations, including the Church, continue their monitoring role and, like the press, may help to keep the risks of corruption and unresponsiveness high through their militancy. It is hoped that political parties could also join in the watch over the civil service outside election periods, and with a view towards promoting fairness rather than their parochial interests.

After two years of Aquino, the Philippine bureaucracy is settling down to an old role in a new setting: that of the dominated institution it has always been, but now in an environment that is greatly developing in its politicization – awakened by the events of 1986 and the crises that led to them. It is not the same bureaucracy it was in 1972, as it has been made insecure by attacks on its permanence, structure and commitments by successive authoritarian and democratic regimes. It had learned in the Marcos years to both taste power with the leadership and to be so cowed as to deny its own professional norms. Meanwhile, in the Aquino years, it has

developed the power of its own organization by the demand for the recovery not only of what it lost under Marcos but of what is being denied it under Aquino.

This bureaucracy under a democracy is different from that of the authoritarian regime: demilitarized, able to maintain openly its links with the people it serves; first forced by the leadership's actions and then tolerated by it to organize; an institution that has become empowered. It is not the power born of access and loyalty, but of one undertaking an organized struggle with the political leadership, demanding democratic procedures; a battle this bureaucracy did not dare wage against the dictatorship. It is also not a power that seeks to impose its will over that of the regime, but in struggling with it, forces the leadership to clarify its vision.

De-Marcosification will come from the continuation of this struggle, as the political leadership begins to recognize that its actions towards the bureaucracy are not simply the work of a superior over a subordinate, but a mirror of the substance of its democracy. As it denies due process, fairness and equity to the bureaucracy, it may make it difficult for the bureaucracy to extend those democratic procedures and criteria to the larger society. As it encourages participation, dialogue and ethical conduct, the political leadership shows the bureaucracy how it can harness democratic procedures and methods for its goals.

Genuine democratization will require substance, and thus needs the point where both the leadership and the bureaucracy become less concerned with their individual gains and focus on what they have to do together. In this, the lead must be taken by the regime, which must now articulate its vision for the society it has brought out of a dictatorship. This vision will tell the civil servants what they are responsible for, beyond their concerns for incentives, stability and day-to-day requirements, and will thus enable the civil service to move closer to becoming a bureaucracy for a democracy.

Endnotes

¹Straw polls in several government agencies showed Cory Aquino leading 65 to 35, similar to the "best guess" of analysts of the actual results of the 1986 presidential elections. Raul P. de Guzman and Luzviminda G. Tancango, "An Assessment of the 1986 Special Presidential Elections: A Study of Political Change through People Power," 2 vols. (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1986).

²Corazon C. Aquino, "Letter to Civil Servants," c. January 1986.

³Republic of the Philippines, Proclamation No. 3 ("The Freedom Constitution"), art. III, sec. 2 (25 March 1986).

⁴In this paper, I distinguish between the "government" and the "bureaucracy" which together comprise the executive branch. I use synonymously "government of the day" (or simply, "government"), "regime" and "political leadership." It includes elective persons as well as those appointed by them to the Cabinet or equivalent posts.

"Bureaucracy," "civil service" and "administrative system" denote the civilian state apparatus. As such, I specifically exclude the military. "Bureaucrats" and "civil servants" occupy what the

country designates as career positions even though the incumbents enter laterally or are not permanent in the service.

⁵There may be two immediate reactions to this coverage: (1) that it is too short; and (2) that the period of analysis is too close to actual events to allow for a more thorough appraisal. The first objection is easier to answer. Although admittedly short, the first two years of Aquino is an identifiable chunk of Philippine history, being the official transition period between the fall of Marcos' authoritarian regime and the first functioning of the newly restored democratic institutions. The first local elections under Aquino, held in January 1988, constituted what Aquino's officials have frequently called the last leg of her process of transition, the others being the ratification of a new constitution and the restoration of the legislature. Although events are still unfolding, it makes sense to look at the period and see whether or not, and to what extent it had lived up to its promises. Note that I am not expecting that the period will already manifest the institutionalization of democracy. However, after a transition period, it is not unfair to seek for evidences of commitments and the initiation of processes that could or could not lead to specific directions.

My distance from the events may be more difficult to explain away but it can be judged independently by the information and interpretations I present.

⁶Juan J. Linz, "The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crises, Breakdown and Reequilibration," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 16.

⁷Robert La Porte, Jr., "Administrative Reform and the Evolution of the Administrative System of Pakistan," in *Administrative Systems Abroad*, ed. Khrishna Tummala (Lanham, New York and London: University Press America, 1982), p. 148.

⁸Hans Rosenburg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660 - 1815* (Boston, 1966), cited in Eugene Kamenka and Martin Krygier, eds., *Bureaucracy: The Career of a Concept* (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1979), p. 8.

⁹Khrishna Tummala, ed., *Administrative Systems Abroad* (Lanham, New York and London: University Press America, 1982); Clarence E. Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham, eds., *Development Administration in Latin America* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973).

¹⁰Charles Parrish, "Bureaucracy, Democracy and Development: Some Considerations Based on the Chilean Case," in Thurber and Graham, eds., *Development Administration in Latin America*, pp. 229-59.

¹¹Seymour Martin Lipset, "Agrarian Socialism: A Study in Political Sociology" (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), pp. 255 - 75, excerpted as "Bureaucracy in Social Change," in *Reader in Bureaucracy*, ed. Robert K. Merton et al. (New York: The Free Press, 1952), pp. 221-33.

¹²Onofre D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).

¹³Many politicians switched parties whenever convenient. For instance, Ramon Magsaysay (president from 1954 to 1957) was Secretary of National Defense under the Liberal Party but ran

for president as a Nacionalista. Ferdinand Marcos (1965 to 1986) was Senate President and president of the Liberal Party when he switched and won as a Nacionalista.

¹⁴Nevertheless, there were few instances of resistance to administrative reform and new policies. Some of these were turf battles between Cabinet officials which civil servants joined as foot soldiers. See Abelardo G. Samonte, "WAPCO: A Case Study of Administrative Reform in the Philippines," in *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, ed. Hahn-Been Lee and Abelardo G. Samonte (Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970), pp. 48-75; and Jose B. Abueva, *Perspectives in Government Reorganization* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969). Others were moves to get exemptions by one agency or one position group which got the nod of legislators (Samonte, 1970). Some changed policy thrusts unconsciously, as lack of program awareness, laziness, inefficiency or lack of resources rendered inutile grand stratagems to increase social access to government. Ledivina V. Cariño, Ma. Concepcion Alfiler and Rebecca Albano, "The Support for Health Programs: A Functional Analysis of the Ministry of Health," report submitted to the Ministry of Health, supported by the IBRD, May 1980.

¹⁵Gregorio A. Francisco, Jr., "A Study of Higher Civil Servants of the Philippines" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1960).

¹⁶Summary dismissals were authorized: "(a) when the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (b) when the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge; and (c) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable." Presidential Decree No. 6, 1972.

¹⁷See Roman Dubsky, "Development and Technocratic Thought in the Philippines" (DPA dissertation, University of the Philippines, 1981); Luzviminda G. Tancangco, "Bureaucracy and Democracy in the Philippines: A Historical Analysis of the Notion and Practice of Political Neutrality in the Civil Service," paper presented at the Conference on Power and Social Responsibility: Elections in Asia and on Pacific, Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, Manila, 2-6 February 1986; and *Ibon Facts and Figures*, Vols. 8-10 (1985-87).

¹⁸R. B. Jain, *Contemporary Issues in Indian Administration* (Delhi: Vishal Publications, 1976).

¹⁹Proclamation No. 3, art. I, sec. 1 (25 March 1986).

²⁰Republic of the Philippines, Presidential Commission on Government Reorganization (PCGR), *Principles and Policy Proposals, Book I: Provisional Report*, 11 June 1986, p. 2.

²¹Linz, p. 42, 113.

²²Kent A. Kirwan, "Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Public Administration --Response to Van Riper," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 18 (February 1987), pp. 389-401; Herbert Storing, "The Crucial Link: Public Administration, Responsibility and the Public Interest," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 24 (March 1964), pp. 39-46.

²³PCGR, *Principles and Policy Proposals*, p. 20.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁵ Executive Order No. 25 on the reorganization under the Commonwealth Government, 25 April 1936), as quoted in Jose V. Abueva, *Perspectives in Government Reorganization*, p. 17, underscoring his.

²⁶ Republic of the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), *Medium Term Plan, 1986-1992* (Manila: NEDA, 1986), pp. 39-40.

²⁷ Leonor M. Briones, "The Morning After: Approaches to Debt Crises," paper presented at the Third National Conference on Public Administration, Manila, 28-30 September 1987; Romeo B. Ocampo, "Privatization, Public Choice and Public Administration," paper presented at the Third National Conference on Public Administration, Manila, 28-30 September 1987.

²⁸ NEDA, *Medium Term Plan, 1986-1992*, p. 6.

²⁹ Corazon C. Aquino, "To Rise From the Ruins," speech before the Makati Business Club, 6 January 1986.

³⁰ Governor Pagdanganan refrained from removing a single employee. Instead, he took the time to reorient them to his new style and programs, and claimed after a year in office that he was already satisfied with them. Roberto Pagdanganan, remarks given at Echo Conference on Public Administration in Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, 11 March 1988.

³¹ They were not all patronage appointments. A little local government history could explain the situation. The last local elections before Martial Law took place in 1971; their terms which were to expire in 1975 were extended until 1980, when Marcos ran local elections as part of the "normalization" process. Except for a few who replaced those removed following a management audit in 1975, the persons whom the Aquino government found in office in 1986 had been there for 15 years. During this period, major developments in local government administration such as the creation of development staffs, local budget, population, nutrition, and other offices had required the appointment of new people. With no provision for local civil servants to move into the national bureaucracy and vice versa, these persons were recruited by the local chief executives and had served only one set of local officials the whole time.

³² CESOs constitute the highest rung of the civil service. Classified by rank, they occupy the positions of assistant regional/bureau director up to deputy minister/undersecretary. Although expected to be career people, CESOs are provided special presidential appointments. These have largely been given for merit rather than patronage. Nevertheless, by the nature of their positions, they have more access to the political leadership than other civil servants. And because the CES has been existing only since 1973, only Marcos has ever appointed anyone as a CESO and they therefore could be misconstrued as his personal choices.

³³ Republic of the Philippines, Development Bank of the Philippines, *Year-End Report, 1986* (1986), p. 5.

³⁴ Republic of the Philippines, Ministry of Social Services and Development, *Year-End Report* (1986), p. 5.

³⁵ Of eight cabinet officials who had earlier run for public office, only the Secretary of Justice, Neptali Gonzales, and holdover National Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile were reported not to

have instituted a purge. Gonzales would later head the E. O. 17 central review committee. Of the non-politicians, there were no reported large-scale summary dismissals (although some did remove employees for reorganization purposes).

³⁶Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, "The Ministry of Health in 1986: Policy Directions and Year-End Accomplishments," report prepared for the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1987; Ruperto Alonzo, "Education," report prepared for the Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1987.

³⁷Patricia Sto. Tomas, remarks given during the Roundtable Discussion on *Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*, sponsored by the Philippine Social Science Council, Philippine National Science Society, and Pi Gamma Mu, Quezon City, 3 May 1988.

³⁸Republic of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 17, sec. 3 (28 May 1986).

³⁹Marcos' grounds. See n. 16.

⁴⁰For instance, employees from one agency were given letters terminating employment "for analogous reasons."

⁴¹Joseph R. Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: MacMillan and Co., 1942), p. 96.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 97-98, quoting Governor General Francis B. Harrison.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 96-97.

⁴⁴Ledivina V. Cariño, "Personnel Policies and Bureaucratic Behavior under Martial Law," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 21, Nos. 3-4 (July-October, 1977), pp. 302-23.

⁴⁵Oscar Aniceto, "The 1986 Revolution and the Bureaucracy," *Civil Service Reporter*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January-March 1986), pp. 5-6.

⁴⁶John Herz, "Denazification and Related Policies," in *From Dictatorship to Democracy* ed. John Herz (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 29.

⁴⁷Arthur E. Tiedemann, "Japan Sheds Dictatorship," in Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, pp. 179-214.

⁴⁸The need for competent administrators to answer the demands of the Cold War and the American economy were also decisive in both countries. These did not figure in the Philippine personnel purge but could be a factor in the current troubles of the government in trying to recover Marcos' wealth.

⁴⁹Harry Psomiades, "Greece from the Colonels' Rule to Democracy," in Herz, ed., *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, pp. 251-74.

⁵⁰M. Aguillon, remarks at the Meeting of the Action Officers of the Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability, Development Academy of the Philippines, Tagaytay City, May 1987.

⁵¹United States, War Department, Bureau of Insular Affairs, *A Report of the Secretary of War containing the Reports of the Taft Commission, its Several Acts of Legislation and other Important Conditions and Immediate Wants of the Philippine Islands* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1901).

⁵²United States, Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands, Bureau of the Civil Service, *First Annual Report, November 15, 1935 to December 31, 1936* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1937).

⁵³Onofre D. Corpuz, *Bureaucracy in the Philippines* (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957).

⁵⁴Raul P. de Guzman, Alex B. Brillantes, Jr., and Arturo G. Pacho, "The Bureaucracy," in *Government and Politics of the Philippines*, ed. Raul P. de Guzman and Mila A. Reforma (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 180-206.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*

⁵⁶Republic of the Philippines, Congress, Senate, Committee on Civil Service Government Reorganization, *Report*, 1988.

⁵⁷de Guzman, Brillantes, and Pacho, "The Bureaucracy," p. 188.

⁵⁸Republic of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 5 (12 March 1986).

⁵⁹Gabriel U. Iglesias, "Government Reorganization Under Aquino: Issues and Problems," paper presented at the Northern Luzon Conference on Public Administration, U. P. College Baguio, 4-6 April 1988.

⁶⁰*Ibon Facts and Figures*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (1987).

⁶¹Republic of the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority, *Philippine Development Report*, updated, 1988.

⁶²Sometimes there were more, because agencies changed hands frequently during the period. Reorganization would be simpler if the current incumbent's draft was simply accepted, but it did not work that way, with the Department of Budget and Management entering as a new key actor in 1987, after inheriting the powers and functions of the PCGR.

⁶³Cabinet-level agencies reverted to the name "department" (from "ministry") after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (in February 1987).

⁶⁴The occasions for Cabinet changes were: the October 1986 firing of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and three other Cabinet officials, one supposedly for leftist views, the other two for rumors of corruption; the February 1987 changes to replace ministers who stood for legislative elections; as a result of the August 28 coup try, the September 1987 resignation of Vice President Salvador Laurel from the Foreign Affairs portfolio, followed soon after by a cabinet revamp which saw the President accepting the courtesy resignations of Executive Secretary Arroyo and Finance Secretary Ongpin; the assassination of Local Government Secretary Jaime Ferrer in December 1987; and the resignation of Enrile's successor in Defense in February 1988. Except for the departure of congressional candidates and Ferrer's, the changes were occasioned by either the desire of the

President to assert her power over the military or to mollify some of its factions while attempting to balance the Cabinet by removing, simultaneously, officials from rival civilian factions.

⁶⁵Danilo R. Reyes, "Tales of the Darkside: Reorganization in the Philippines as a Many Splendored Thing," concept paper presented before the Roundtable Discussion on *Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*, sponsored by the Philippine Social Science Council, Philippine National Science Society and Pi Gamma Mu, Quezon City, 3 May 1988.

⁶⁶Republic of the Philippines, *1987 Constitution*, art. XVIII, sec. 18.

⁶⁷Iglesias, "Government Reorganization Under Aquino: Issues and Problems.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*

⁶⁹Patricia Sto. Tomas, remarks during the Roundtable Discussion on *Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*.

⁷⁰NEDA, *Philippine Development Report*, pp. 13-19.

⁷¹*Ibid.*

⁷²PCGR, *Principles and Policy Proposals*.

⁷³Thelma Mariano, "Critique of Ledivina V. Cariño's 'One Year of Shotgun Marriage,'" term paper submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements in Public Administration 291, Summer 1988.

⁷⁴Francisco Barranta, remarks delivered during the Roundtable Discussion on *Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*, sponsored by Philippine Social Science Council, Philippine National Science Society and Pi Gamma Mu, Quezon City, 3 May 1988.

⁷⁵Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Letter-Circular, 10 October 1987.

⁷⁶Renato Constantino and Letizia Constantino, *The Philippines: The Continuing Past* (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978).

⁷⁷Amelia P. Varela, *Administrative Culture and Political Change* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1987).

⁷⁸Samonte, p. 54.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁸¹Guadalupe Mapili, "Implementation of the Classification and Pay Plans in Selected Agencies" (MPA Thesis, Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1964), in Lee and Samonte, eds., *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, pp. 59-61.

⁸²College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Seminar on *Political Neutrality of the Civil Service*, Manila, 1986.

⁸³1987 Constitution, art. XVII, sec. 17.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, art. XVII, sec. 18.

⁸⁵WAGES includes COURAGE, PGEA, the Alliance of Health Workers, the Alliance of Concerned Teachers and the Alliance of Government Financial Institution Employees, all in turn a conglomeration of smaller employee organizations.

⁸⁶Wage Adjustment for Government Employees Solidarity (WAGES), Circular, undated, c. September 1987.

⁸⁷LINGKOD alleged nepotism, favoritism and political patronage in the reorganization, and used noise barrage and walkouts to dramatize their plight. I was invited to their initial meeting in June 1986 when they were still checking out if they could or should organize. Significantly, the seminar was opened by the Deputy Administrator and seemed to me then to show a possibility for dialogue that later events did not bear out.

⁸⁸1987 Constitution, art. III, sec. 8.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, art. XIII, sec. 3.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, art. IX on Civil Service Commission, sec. 2(5).

⁹¹Republic of the Philippines, Civil Service Commission, Memorandum Circular No. 6, 21 April 1987.

⁹²Victoria A. Bautista, "Public Interest Perspective: A Neglected Dimension in the Study of Corruption," *Philippine Sociological Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (July-December 1983), pp. 45-54; Belinda A. Aquino, *Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos* (Manila: Great Books and College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1987).

⁹³Jose P. de Jesus, remarks delivered during the Panel on Graft and Corruption, Program for Mobilizing the Bureaucracy for Results, Development Academy of the Philippines, Tagaytay City, 18 May 1988.

⁹⁴Aquino, *Politics of Plunder*, p. 1.

⁹⁵Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, "Administrative Measures against Bureaucratic Corruption: The Philippine Experience," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4 (July-October, 1979), pp. 321-49.

⁹⁶Republic of the Philippines, Presidential Committee on Public Ethics and Accountability (PCPEA), *Report*, 1987.

⁹⁷Ledivina V. Cariño, "The Definition of Graft and Corruption and the Conflict of Ethics and Law," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 23, Nos. 3-4 (July-October, 1979), pp. 221-40.

⁹⁸Roger Singson, remarks given at the Panel on Graft and Corruption, Program for Mobilizing the Bureaucracy for Results, Development Academy of the Philippines, Tagaytay City, 18 May 1988.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰Republic of the Philippines, Ministry of Health, "One Hundred Days in San Lazaro: Report to the President" (1986).

¹⁰¹Bienvenido Alano, remarks delivered at the Panel on Graft and Corruption, Program for Mobilizing the Bureaucracy for Results, Development Academy of the Philippines, Tagaytay City, 18 May 1988.

¹⁰²Leonor M. Briones, "Trends in Expenditures for Foreign Travel of Ministers and Senior Government Officials, 1985 and 1986," paper prepared for the Commission on Audit, 1987.

¹⁰³Ma. Concepcion P. Alfiler, "Ensuring Accountability of the Philippine Service," paper presented at the Northern Luzon Conference on Public Administration, U. P. College, Baguio, 4-6 April 1988.

¹⁰⁴This allows for mobility for junior officers, a cause of dissatisfaction under the old dispensation.

¹⁰⁵Human rights advocates denounce these groups as military informants and surrogates who perpetrate torture and other violations of human rights; the military defends them as people-power against Communists, using a favorite term of post-revolutionary Philippines.

¹⁰⁶Jose V. Abueva, *Focus on the Barrio* (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1959).

¹⁰⁷Joseph B. Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (New York: G. B. Putnam and Sons, 1976).

¹⁰⁸Frances Korten, "Stimulating Community Participation: Obstacles and Options of Agency, Community and Societal Levels," *Rural Development Participation Review* (Spring 1981), pp. 1-16.

¹⁰⁹Gelia T. Castillo, *How Participatory is Participatory Development?: A Review of the Philippine Experience* (Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1983); Ledivina V. Cariño and Associates, *Integration, Participation and Effectiveness: An Analysis of the Operation and Effects of Five Rural Health Delivery Mechanisms* (Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies, 1982).

¹¹⁰Amanda Valenzuela, ed., *The Administration of Health Services: Focus on Primary Health Care* (Diliman, Quezon City: University of the Philippines' Management Education Council, 1982).

¹¹¹Fred W. Riggs, "Unity of Politics and Administration: Implications for Development," paper prepared for delivery at the Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Anaheim, California, April 1986.

¹¹²Suk-Choon Cho, "Two Reforms under the Military Government in Korea: A Comparative Analysis," in Lee and Samonte, eds., *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, pp. 125-64.

¹¹³ Mohammad Mohabhat Khan and Habib Zafarullah, "Public Bureaucracy in Bangladesh," in Tummala, ed., *Administrative Systems Abroad*, pp. 158-87; John Herz, referring to Japan and Europe, in *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, pp. 15-38.

¹¹⁴ Herz, pp. 15-38.

¹¹⁵ La Porte, in Tummala, ed., *Administrative Systems Abroad*, p. 148.

¹¹⁶ Peter S. Cleaves and Martin J. Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1979).

¹¹⁷ Paul Oquist, "El Estado Revolucionario en Nicaragua," paper read at the Seminar on Planning and Administration of Development in Central America and the Carribean, sponsored by the Escuela de Superior de Administracion Publica de Colombia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bogota, Colombia, May 1986.

¹¹⁸ *Solidarity*, Special Issue on "The Battered Bureaucracy," No. 10 (January-February, 1987), pp. 9-78.

¹¹⁹ Karina David, remarks delivered at the Roundtable Discussion on *Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*, sponsored by Philippine Social Science Council, Philippine National Science Society and Pi Gamma Mu, Quezon City, 3 May 1988.

¹²⁰ PCGR, *Principles and Policy Proposals*, p. 13.